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This study examined the constitutional limitations placed on the President of the
United States of America during times of war. This study was based on the premise that
presidents exceed Constitutional limitations when in times of crisis and or emergency.
To conduct this study, the war time presidencies of Presidents Johnson during the
Vietnam War and Bush during the Iraq War were examined. This research is both a
qualitative analysis and a comparative case study and was chosen because at least two
cases need to be observed to study the persons and events which pertain to the
substantive issues to be explored.
The researcher found that even though it is clear that the United States
Constitution limits the power of the president to initiate war without congressional
consent, both President Johnson and Bush were able to secure congressional consent, in
part, because they influenced congress to act within a context of uncertainty and often
misinformation. Therefore, they did not exceed their constitutionally granted authority
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they used the media, influence, public opinion and other factors to expand their
presidential powers.
The conclusion drawn from the findings suggest that given the President’s control
of intelligence that is often uncertain, political scientists need to research the practicality
of providing Congress with an independent entity to cross check the intelligence provided
by the President. Constitutional scholars should continue to explore presidential
decisions to initiate war by authorizing law that force the executive branch to justify
decisions to go to war. Also, the focus of research regarding the extra-constitutional use
of war authority should shift to an analysis of what makes congress, the media, and the
public so complicit when war is initiated.
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE LAW: WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA? A FOCUS ON
LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND GEORGE W. BUSH IN TIMES OF WAR
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
BY
KEYLA AMIL JACKSON
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
May 2011
Table of Contents (continued)
CHAPTER PAGE
IV. PRESIDENTIAL WAR AUTHORITY AND THE VIETNAM
WAR 42
The Role of Ideology 43
Congress and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 45
Uncertain Intelligence 45
The Congressional Response 50
Sleeping Giants 55
The Media in the Initiation of the Vietnam War 58
The Media and Democratic Theory 58
The Context for Media Influence during the Vietnam War 60
Media Access to Information 62
The Media and Public Opinion and the Initiation of the
Vietnam War 64
Media Objectivity 66
President Lyndon Johnson and the Media 70
IV. A CASE STUDY OF GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE DECISION
TO INITIATE THE IRAQ WAR 73
The Role of Ideology and Public Policy in Expanding
Presidential Power for the Iraq War 76
9/11, the War on Terror, and the Spread of Democracy 78
The Bush Doctrine and the National Security Strategy
of 2002 78
Implementing the Bush Doctrine 80
The Role of Congress in Initiating the Iraq War and
Confirming the Bush Doctrine 80
Congressional Response 85
Congressional Reaction to the USA Patriot Act 86
Congressional Response to the Initiation of the Iraq War 89
Uncertainty of Intelligence 90
The Con Man Who Caused a War 91
Uncertain Intelligence and Policy Formulation 93
Assembling Faulty Intelligence 93
Intelligence and the Policy Apparatus 96
National Intelligence Estimate 2002 97
The Axis of Evil 97
Powell and the UN 99
Congress Reacts 101
The Media in the Initiation of the Iraq War 104
111
Table of Contents (continued)
CHAPTER PAGE
Objectivity and Dependence 105
Media Objectivity 106
Public Opinion and the Initiation of the Iraq War 112
V. SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 115
Summary 115
Findings and Conclusions 117
Conducive Factors Promoting the Vietnam and Iraq Wars 117
Congress 119





1. Congressional Action on the USA Patriot Act by Date 88
2. Public Support for Going to War with Iraq 113
3. Factors Relative to the Johnson and Bus Administrations 115
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
“I pray heaven to bestow the best of blessings on this house (the White
House) and on all those who shall hereafter inhabit it. May none but
honest and wise men ever rule under this roofi”
John Adams
The office of the presidency is one of the most difficult and underappreciated jobs
in the world. The person who holds this office has the enormous responsibility of
protecting the immediate and long range needs of citizens in a free society. He also has
the onus of evaluating and responding to international crises. To enforce national
security, the president assumes the role of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and
to create policy suited to the political, economic, and social vagaries of an ever more
diverse America, he must simultaneously manage a plethora of duties as Administrative
Head of State. Although it is necessary to ensure a job well done, the broad authority
given to the president by the Constitution to carry out his duties can also be disastrous if
abused. As President John Adams stated, the individual who holds this office must be
honest, wise, and possess great integrity.
While honesty, wisdom, and integrity are characteristics dear to citizens when
electing officials to public office, the individuals who hold the office of the presidency
1. Carol H. Behrman, John Ada,ns (Minneapolis, MN: Lemer Publications, 2004), 9
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occasionally exceed legal and moral boundaries and are sometimes a part of clandestine
activities ofwhich the average citizen would not approve. Such pursuits are often
justified by citing the powers given to the president by the Constitution, particularly
during war, when citizens are more apt to ignore abuses of power because ofperceived
national security issues or patriotic fervor. It is during war time, then, that public interest
groups, objective guardians of citizen rights, average Americans and the media must ask
the question, What are the constitutional limitations placed on the President of the United
States of America during times of war?
Too often throughout history, American citizens express disdain for and distrust
of the actions of public officials, including the president. Particularly since World War
II, a decline in the respect for legislative and executive bodies on both sides of the
political spectrum is sporadically evidenced in public opinion polls, blogs, radio talk
shows, and a rise in political activism, no matter what presidential era. While these forms
of expression alert officials that their actions are not viewed favorably, if these actions
are not catastrophic, public disdain is seldom met by Congress or the Court with
retribution. Therefore, when exploring presidential limitations, it is important to consider
the concept of presidential prerogative, especially during catastrophic circumstances such
as war or attacks on the homeland.
There are several reasons why this study has importance and efficacy. An inquiry
into the question of presidential limitations or prerogative is pertinent because
presidential actions during war time directly affect the general welfare of the American
people as well as the families whose sons and daughters offer their lives on behalf of their
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country. Though wars can be beneficial by solidifying strategic interests, they can also
deplete financial and environmental resources, which can be detrimental. Wars also have
a direct effect on the nation’s deficit, thus impeding economic growth. With so much at
stake, the question again becomes a matter of how much authority and power the
President should have to declare war based solely on presidential prerogative. Many
believe there should be greater power sharing between the Congress and the President as
the Constitution seems to require. Hence, a presidential limitation is an issue of great
concern.
To adequately explore the concept of presidential limitations, specifically during
times of war, the following factors are operative: the effect of Congress on presidential
decisions, the accuracy of intelligence available to the executive branch, the influence of
the media, and to a lesser extent, the influence of public opinion. Understanding the
foregoing factors helps promote insight into why some presidents exercise a broader
range of powers and other presidencies are characterized by a more restrained use of
authority. As history has shown, the unrestricted use of power in the wrong hands could
potentially destroy a nation or society, so that an examination of the research and a
focused delineation of the issue can assist in encouraging a proactive stance against
excesses in the form of presidential abuse of power. This discussion is also timely
because America is currently at war in two volatile areas of the world, political and
economic engagements which have severely drained the American economy and is
responsible for the deaths of thousands of people. Is this an example of what can occur
when presidential authority runs amok? As a result of this investigation, exploration of
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the issue could have broad application in the improvement of lives of all citizens, not just
one specific interest group, race, gender, or religion. Preventing unnecessary wars is in
the best interest of everyone.
Still another outcome of this study is the interest it should stimulate among
political scientists, especially in the areas of study concerned with distribution of power
and the allocation of resources as it pertains to politics. Today’s scholars write about
presidential power and many analyses have been done on the consequences of
presidential decision making during times of war. However, there is a gap in the
literature specifically related to constitutional limitations on presidential power,
especially during times of war. Therefore, this study seeks to expand on available
literature and focuses exclusively on the limits to presidential power during times of war.
The research presented draws from the areas of constitutional law and politics and the
American political process.
To further narrow the focus of the research, Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and
George W. Bush, both of whom made independent decisions which led the United States
into two of the most bloody, costly, and unpopular wars in American history, are used as
touchstones undergirding certain basic principles of the research question Since both
wars were so deadly and in some instances, even reviled by the American public, these
two conflicts can be illustrative of the role certain provisions of the United States
Constitution played or should have played in limiting the catastrophic results of the
decisions of both presidents. As a result of the choices made, the thesis presented here
will further substantiate that the two wars are regarded as mistakes, though in varying
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degrees, by many members of the public, scores of congressmen and women, more than a
few scholars and various members of the media.
The central legal question for many regarding presidential war-making authority
depends on the interpretation of wording in the United States Constitution. Therefore,
one must consider, within the context of the Constitution and other extenuating
circumstances, how Presidents Johnson and Bush lead the nation into wars that were
eventually deemed colossal errors. Focusing on all the constitutional war-making
provisions prior to and during the initiation of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars is an efficient
approach to studying the actual versus supposed limitations on presidents during times of
war.
Objective of Paper and Central Research Question
The paper presented here explores the constraints on the President of the United
States of America during times of war, which is accomplished by conducting a
comparative and qualitative case study, examining the power of two Commanders in
Chief: President Johnson during the Vietnam War and President Bush during the Iraq
War. Additionally, this manuscript focuses on whether or not the presidential powers
employed by both presidents before entering war were constrained by the United States
Constitution and Congress, whether both presidents fell victim to the accuracy or
inaccuracy of intelligence, whether media displayed the kind of critical analysis it should
have, and whether overt expressions of public opinion influenced presidential or
congressional decisions before and during the war. The specific questions to which this
study seeks answers are the following: first, what are the effective constitutional
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limitations on the U.S President during times of war and are they needed; and second,
have U.S. Presidents exceeded their constitutional authority to initiate war? Though
legal and political science scholars have demonstrated that politics and law are not
always exceptionally clear areas of study, answering these questions will promote a better
understanding of presidential authority and allow citizens and other stakeholders a basis
for making the executive branch of government more accountable for its actions.
The questions are explored by probing constitutional provisions, which
specifically and implicitly give direction to the executive branch of government in times
of military emergency. Also, both a critical examination of the original intent of
constitutional wording and the lack of consensus concerning certain provisions are
discussed. Other decisive factors such as systematic efforts by presidents to influence
public opinion and scrutiny of media presence or absence as a purveyor of crucial
information are explored to better understand why certain presidencies are subject to
significant power constraints and other presidencies are more aggressive in the exercise
of executive authority with little or no restrictions in initiating war.
In short, President John Adams’s dream that “none but honest and wise men
should ever rule under the White House roof’ did not prevail in the above referenced
instances of war. This paper sought, therefore, to provide an in-depth analysis of
presidential limitations in hopes of suggesting remedies for whatever shortcomings in the
way congress and the president operate.
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Major Concepts and Theoretical Underpinnings
The theoretical paradigm governing this paper mirrors scholar Arthur
Schlesinger’s model in the book, The Imperial Presidency, which questions whether in
the modern era, 1945 to the present, a strong presidency can exist within an equally
strong system of accountability.2 When the constitutional balance is upset in favor of
presidential power and at the expense of presidential accountability, the presidency,
according to Schlesinger, becomes “imperial.”3 To explore this topic, the major
concepts examined are presidential power and presidential limitations. For the purpose
of this paper, the operational concepts are also power and limitations. The salient
definitions are as follows: presidential war powers are those derived from the
Constitution and legislatively through the War Powers Act.4 Limitations are the
constraints implied by congressional war making authority and the influence of the media
and public opinion.
In addition to the Imperial Presidency discussed in the next section, several
primary and secondary sources were examined to investigate the actions of Presidents
Johnson and Bush in order to answer the two research questions posed in this thesis.
Literature Review
Over the years, research has been conducted on the administrations of various
presidents and has addressed many areas of interest to researchers and scholars including





the lives of the first family, presidential rhetoric, presidents during peacetime, presidents
in crisis, presidential privilege, presidential domestic and foreign policy, presidential
fashion, presidential education, the socioeconomic background of presidential candidates
and much more. Because of the wide scope of American presidential history, it is
appropriate for this paper to narrow the focus to limitations on presidential power during
times of war.
While a significant body of literature has evolved on presidents at war, it is
difficult to extrapolate a body of scholarly research focused specifically on when an
American president has exceeded his constitutional limitations. For that reason, this
paper is a qualitative and comparative analysis that explores presidential power and the
law. It focuses on the limitations of the presidential prerogative during times of war. The
empirical data for this paper were derived from case studies of President Johnson during
the Vietnam War and President Bush during the Iraq War. The two wars were chosen
because they were two of the longest and most unpopular in American history.
The relevance of the study grows out of the enduring need to strike a critical
balance within the machinery of governmental decision making. Congress, with the
adoption of the War Powers Act, reasserted its authority in making decisions to go to
war. Many in Congress considered the War Powers Act a counterweight to the tendency
either to abruptly enter or slowly drift into a war the country cannot win and that is costly
in terms of lives and money. In addition, the subject of presidential power and its
limitations during times of war is important to political scientists because it relates both
to the presidential exercise of power as the Commander in Chief and the understanding
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and expectation that the president is authorized to take decisive action, without
congressional consultation when required, to protect the nation from foreign enemies.
Can Congress hold the president accountable for his actions and the decisions that lead to
them during times of war?
Problematic is the fact that the United States Constitution gives both the Congress
and the President different degrees of war-making authority. There seems to be no clear
consensus on where the ultimate authority to declare war rests. The increasing tendency
for foreign military threats to take the form of tenorism has brought the historic tension
over war-making authority between the Congress and the President to a new level of
vigorous debate.
The paper presented here reviews literature on both sides of the issue regarding
the limits of presidential war-making powers. The optimistic expectation is that the case
studies of Presidents Johnson and Bush will provide insights on the practical constraints
that limit executive discretion to initiate war. Finally, the balance, if any, that has been
achieved between legislative and executive branches of government for authorizing and
exercising the power to enter war, will be examined.
Review of the Relevant Literature
The literature reviewed for this study can be placed into multiple categories.
However, the simplest and most useful way to group the works is by their general or
specific nature regarding presidential power and its relationship to one of the two
presidents under study, Johnson and Bush. Several of the works provide a general
overview of presidential power, but most provide specific insight on how presidents
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interpret and use their power. Others address the subject at hand in more comprehensive
terms and trace the use of war-making authority by the two presidents including their
interactions with Congress, the media and the public.
President Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War
Historian Forest McDonald, along with President Bush, Vice President Cheney,
and White House Deputy Counsel John Yoo believed the office of the President is
already much too constrained in its efforts to govern. In the book, The American
Presidency: An Intellectual History, Forest McDonald explains that while the office of
the Presidency is the most powerful office in the world, it is also restrained by the power
of the United States Congress, the courts, popular opinion, the news media and state and
local governments. McDonald’s work gets to the core of the subject at hand; however,
his conclusions are at odds with those of most who have written about the use of
presidential power during the modern presidency
General H. R. McMaster, U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center’s Concept
Development and Experimentation Directorate in his book, Dereliction ofDuty, discusses
who was responsible for the decisions that led up to the Vietnam War. It details secret
meetings, exclusive access to personal diaries, interviews with participants, and oral
histories. This book is important to the undertaking of this paper because it places the
critical decision to initiate the Vietnam War not with President Johnson, but with his
military advisers.5 The important question becomes, based on the McMasters’
assessment, to what extent did the Congress, the media, and the public have access to the
5. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction ofDuty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint ChiefofStaff and the
Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 47-49.
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information that military advisers provided to the president; and if they had it, was their
interpretation of the information used to withhold support or conversely, champion
President Johnson in his decision to initiate war against North Vietnam? Other aspects
of this thesis further address the issue of constraints on presidential authority posed by the
congress, media, and public opinion.
While the formal restraints from the Congress and other constituencies mentioned
by McDonald are evident, there is little to show that the President’s powers have been
limited between 1945 and the present. Again, the constraints cited by McDonald do
exist; however, most often it appears that these controls exist under a magic wand of
presidential power. This paper seeks to understand if these efforts to moderate
presidential powers truly inhibit the chief executive’s ability to move forward with a war
time agenda or if these restraints are simply obstacles that have to be overcome in order
for the American President to exert near absolute power to initiate war.
In his seminal work, Imperial Presidency, Schlesinger discusses presidential
power as it relates to constitutional power.6 In relationship to the study presented here,
Schlesinger’s work takes an in-depth look at the United States Constitution and discusses
how American presidents have broadly interpreted the Constitution to gain power not
specifically given to them in the U.S Constitution. Schlesinger looks at presidents from
Lincoln to Clinton, examines their presidencies during wartime, and renders examples
which illustrate instances during which each president established and influenced the
6. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, 162-172; Gregory Sidak, “To Decalre War,” Duke Law
Journal4l, no. 1(1991): 27-121.
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imperial presidency as it is known today. As one of the leading scholars on the history of
the presidency, Schlesinger analyzes original intent as it relates to presidential power.
Within the context of this original intent, Schlesinger provides an exhaustive look
at the interaction between President Johnson and the United States Congress surrounding
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which essentially gave the president carte blanche to
conduct the war in Vietnam as he saw fit. The work of Schlesinger on the Johnson
presidency and the Vietnam War is compelling in its analysis because it uses original
sources, which in some unique ways would qualify it as a primary source. Ultimately,
Schlesinger concludes that modern U.S. Presidents have clearly exceeded their
constitutional war-making authority. However, the author does not provide a satisfying
answer as to why presidents are allowed to continue to extend the war-making power
given to them in the Constitution.
Other scholars, who like Schlesinger were contemporaries of President Johnson,
sharply disagree with McDonald’s assessment that practical constraints were in the past
and are still now effectively imposed on the President of the United States. For example,
Elmer Cornwell, Jr. writing in a 1965 work titled, Presidential Leadership ofPublic
Opinion, concluded that the modern president’s ability to influence public opinion
through the media has tremendously strengthened the power of the office and made the
presidency the center of the national government.7 Cornwell also points out that his
theory as a top-down process allows for the president to control public opinion, which is
radically different from the model posed by most democratic theorists, who generally
7. Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership ofPublic Opinion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1966), 5.
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posit a bottom-up process8. Cornwell’s study is relevant because as McDonald argues
and the researcher postulates, public opinion is generally considered a constraint on
presidential power. Further empirical analysis provided in this paper will test the
opposing propositions made by both McDonald and Cornwell.
Kathleen Turner, former reporter at the New York Times, in her assessment of the
relationship between President Johnson and the media titled Lyndon Johnson ‘s Dual
War: Vietnam and the Press, shows how Lyndon Johnson manipulated the press. She
argues and Cornwell concurs that President Johnson mixed a variety of styles for
interacting with the press that embodied many of the manipulative behaviors of FDR and
JFK and literally kept the press ignorant of important facts related to war.9 Johnson
conducted rather idiosyncratic press conferences known as walking tours. To minimize
questions, he held long, exhausting one-on-one sessions with reporters, and employed
unannounced press conferences to keep newspapers, radio and televisions stations from
sending their most informed experts, thus lessening intelligent exchanges. In the end,
Turner concludes President Johnson dominated the press, and once the fourth estate was
suitably neutralized, expanded his power to make war time decisions, many ofwhich
were first evident during the initial expansion of what was called the Vietnam conflict
into a major war of attrition.
8. Ibid.
9. Kathleen Turner, Lyndon Johnson ‘~s Dual War. Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University
Press of Chicago, 1986), 75-77.
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President George W. Bush and the Iraq War
George W. Bush is the nation’s most recent past president and much has been
written about his controversial use of presidential power during a time of war. In 2007,
Charlie Savage, a reporter for the Boston Globe, published Takeover: The Return of the
Imperial Presidency. 10 The book draws its inspiration from the timeless work of Arthur
Schlesinger and uses the Constitution as its context. Savage, however, adds substantially
to a general understanding of the use of presidential power and as well as its limits. He
analyzes the way that President George W. Bush, along with his confidant, Vice
President Dick Chaney, and his Deputy White House Counsel, John Yoo, set out to
expand presidential power.
Savage, for example, highlights two aspects of the Bush Administration that have
been employed to expand presidential power, which is contrary to the proposition set
forth by McDonald.” He examines the role of the legal counsel in the Executive
Branch, especially the role of John C. Yoo who made a sophisticated, but according to
some scholars, flawed argument regarding the expansive use of the presidential
prerogative. Savage also explains how President Bush used “signing statements” to
interpret and sometimes rewrite laws that were passed by congress. Based on an
extensive examination of the interactions between Congress and the President, concludes
that with the exception of Harry Truman, George W. Bush exercised more war time




powers than any other man who has held the Executive office during the era of the
modern presidency.’2
Another illuminating work is that of Peter Gaibraith, former ambassador to
Croatia, and political commentator, which is titled, The End ofIraq: How American
Incompetence Created a War without End. It describes the Bush administration’s
strategic miscalculations about the war in Iraq and addresses one of the fundamental
issues regarding American intervention in that country.’3 Given the political, religious,
and cultural information from military intelligence and the CIA that the Bush
Administration should have had on Iraq, how could the president assume that winning a
war in Iraq would be easy? The book goes on to discuss the president’s inability or
unwillingness to recognize the various issues that already divided the people in Iraq
before the invasion of their homeland. 14 In raising certain essential issues about the
origins of the war and the question of presidential prerogative, Gaibraith’s book provides
the perfect vehicle for exploration of the Bush administration’s lack of political acuity
and foresight as well as the Commander in Chiefs calculated misuse of presidential
powers.
Still another respected work is John Keegan’s The Iraq War, which re-examines
the steps that led to the Iraq War. Keegan’s most significant contribution to the study of
presidential power and the launching of the Iraq war is to show the failure of Westerners,
12. Ibid.
13. John Keegan, The Iraq War: The Military Offensive, from the Victory in 21 Days to the
Insuregnt (New York: First Vintage Books, 2005), 63-69.
14. Ibid.
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especially Americans, to more fully understand the Islamic culture to which most Iraqis
subscribe. This lack of appreciation for the depth and seriousness of religious beliefs
exhibited by the Iraqis combined with a lack ofpolitical sensitivity to existing
factionalism within the country contributed to the political and military problems that
were encountered. Keegan also points out that it was an intelligence failure in the
broadest sense that contributed to the decisions to invade Iraq.’5 Interviews with top
military officials give a first-hand account of an overconfident, irresponsible mindset at
the highest levels of command, which ultimately led to what many consider a failed war
in Iraq. Finally, Keegan’s book contributes to the analysis of these events by revealing
the mistakes leading up to the invasion and by addressing the dynamics of presidential
authority and faulty intelligence.
Thomas Ricks’ book, Fiasco: the American Adventure in Iraq, speaks directly to
the issue of intelligence and the role that it played in President Bush’s decision to invade
Iraq. Ricks is a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist formerly at the Wall Street Journal and
Washington Post. The most relevant chapter in Ricks’ book explains how the Bush
administration deliberately used uncertain intelligence to take the country to war. Ricks
states emphatically that the administration provided Secretary of State Cohn Powell with
questionable intelligence that he then presented to the United Nations as a justification
for an American invasion of Iraq. Although Ricks admits that his is a journalistic and not
a scholarly work, several sources, for example the books Curveball by Drogin of the Los
Angeles Times and the Plan of attack by Woodward of the Washington Post both provide
15. Keegan, The Iraq War, 63-69.
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evidence used for this thesis that substantiate his contentions regarding the use of faulty
intelligence.
Bob Woodward who helped to brake the Watergate story and is now an Associate
Editor at the Washington Post in his four books reveals the behind-the-scene story of
how, after the initial shock of the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration led the
nation to war. Woodward’s work taken as a whole has extensive quotations from secret
deliberations of the National Security Council and first hand revelations ofprivate
thoughts, concerns, and fears of the President and his war cabinet.’6 The trilogy, Bush at
War, is a two volume work that touches on the different aspects of this study: the
Constitution and presidential power, the congress and its role, the influence of the media,
and the impact of public opinion as constraints on the president’s power to initiate war.
Collectively, these books provide generalized information on presidential power;
original intent and the various presidencies during wartime, including Presidents Johnson
and Bush. However, research has shown that while questions have been asked regarding
presidential power and its limitations, numerous studies have not produced specifics on
the limitations of presidential powers. Therefore, the books in this review are used to
further explore the thesis.
Methodology
This paper examines presidential power, the law and the limits of power of the
President of the United States of America. To conduct this study, the war time
presidencies of Presidents Johnson during the Vietnam War and Bush during the Iraq
War will be examined. This research will be both a qualitative analysis and a
16. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 75-85.
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comparative case study, and were chosen because at least two cases need to be observed
to study the persons and events which pertain to the substantive issues to be explored.
These methods were also chosen because a detailed and systematic examination of the
content of presidential power during wartime is necessary for identifying the patterns and
themes which relate to how the presidents of the United States utilized their constitutional
powers while in office during times of crisis. This paper postulates that war time
presidents have the ability and if not the potential to unlawfully supersede constitutional
limitations. Consequently, each observation will belong to its own nominally significant
category, either supporting or opposing the proposition.
Analytical Framework
Approach
The writer conducted the research through an analysis of several factors,
including but not limited to the following:
• A historical and contemporary examination of Constitutional intent via war-
making powers, and Congressional response to executive decisions to go to
war within the context of constitutionally granted authority and,
• The political developments, including executive justification and the anemic
media and public responses that resulted in the assumption of presidential
authority to initiate both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars.
Data Collection
The thesis presented here was conducted with document study. An analysis was
done of both primary and secondary sources related to the political and constitutional




The secondary sources primarily consulted included journal articles in JSTORE
by scholars who have studied the constitutional issues relative to decisions to initiate the
Vietnam and Iraq wars. The research is also based on some first-hand observations of
government officials whose positions allowed them to write interpretations of events.
The most heavily used journalistic sources were books and journal articles by newspaper
reporters. For example, a primary journalistic source is an analysis of the coverage of the
period of the Vietnam War addressed in this study, which is the summer of 1964 and an
entire book explaining the intelligence blunder that contributed to the Iraq War.
Primary Sources
The primary sources used to develop this thesis include the original writings of
individuals involved with the wars or who were themselves policy makers or had access
to policy makers with responsibility to advise the presidents in making decisions to
initiate war. The primary sources include the auto biography ofPresident Lyndon Baines
Johnson, memoirs by Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk, and The Secret Johnson White
House Tapes, 1964-1965, by Michael Beschloos.
The author of this thesis was also able to draw on the work of several individuals
who were directly involved with government officials during the Vietnam War and have
provided first-hand accounts of various aspects of this study. These works were the
following:
• The Winds ofFreedom: Selectionsfrom the Speeches and Statements of
Secretary ofState Dean RuskJanuaiy 1961-A ugust 1962.
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• Why the Senate Slept by Ezra Y. Siff. Siff served as an aide to Senator Wayne
Morse, one of the two senators who opposed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
and
• The work of James Reston, a journalist who covered and was consulted by
Lyndon Johnson and who wrote a piece for the Council on Foreign Relations
titled, The Artillery of the Press: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy.
Regarding President Bush, two works were found to be critical to the study presented
here. The constitutional context for the actions of President Bush was provided by the
specific writings of John C. Yoo, who served as Deputy White House Counsel in the
Bush administration. Other vital sources employed were the books by Bob Woodward
depicting events leading up to the Iraq War, including The Plan ofAttack. During the
writing of this critically acclaimed New York Times best seller, Woodward was granted
unprecedented access to the Bush Administration, including to all of the key players
involved in the decision to go to war in Iraq. Additionally, this thesis used as a primary
source the autobiography of former CIA Director George Tenet, At the Center of the
Storm: My Years at the CIA. One more journalistic resource used in the study is Bob
Drogin’s work, Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused A War.
Finally, for both case studies the presidents’ original documents were used when
they were relevant and available. These included but not limited to presidential speeches,
congressional resolutions, and National Intelligence Estimates. Also, historical




The goal of this paper is to reexamine the constraints on the use of presidential
power to initiate war. In recent years, there has been much debate over the president’s
use of power during war, which has also included re-assessments of President Johnson’s
policies during the Vietnam War. While researching primary and secondary sources on
the limitations of presidential powers during times of war, the author realized that the
more interesting question was how presidential power was used to initiate war.
Unfortunately, American history makes clear that once the nation is in a war, the
president has unfettered power to execute, and if he deems it necessary, to expand the
war. Therefore, critical to understanding the use of presidential power during war times
is the need to determine how a modern president, within the context of the United States
Constitution with its shared decision making and checks and balances, has the power to
initiate war with minimal objections from Congress, the media, or the public. Finally, the
paper seeks to glean new insights that provide a better understanding of the use of
presidential power that leads into conflict and policies which make presidents more
accountable for the use of their war-making powers.
Statement on the Structure of the Presentation of Research
The thesis consists of five chapters which are outlined below:
Chapter 1: Introduction: Statement of the Problem, Review of Relevant
Literature and Research, and Methodology
Chapter 2: The Historical and Constitutional Context of Executive War
Making Authority
Chapter 3: A Case Study of President Lyndon Johnson and the Decision to
Initiate the Vietnam War
Chapter 4: A Case Study of President George W. Bush and the Decision to
Initiate the Iraq War
Chapter 5: Findings, Summary, and Conclusions
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CHAPTER!!
THE HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF
EXECUTIVE WAR-MAKING AUTHORITY
The Historical Context
In the United States, the power lies with the people. An excerpt from the
Declaration of Independence states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure
these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.
The Declaration of Independence was created during a period when the thirteen
colonies were attempting to counter the abuses of the Crown and propose political and
economic principles that were fairer in the treatment of the colonists. In doing so, they
made an effort to gain control of who represented them and the power those individuals
would have over their lives. The effort to gain control of American political life led to
America’s first Constitution, which was the Articles of Confederation. This document
was created in an attempt to establish the structure of the confederation of the thirteen
colonies and to ensure that no one person or governing body would be able to reign
supreme over the American people. Feariful of repeating the history they lived under the
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edicts of King George and the Parliament, the writers of the Articles of Confederation did
the following: (1) Gave each state powers not expressly delegated to the federal
government, (2) Gave each state one vote in Congress, and (3) Gave state governments
increased powers of governance as opposed to emphasis on the authority of a strong,
“imperial” government.
While the idea of the Articles of Confederation was a significant step in American
history, they were unsuccessful. One area of disagreement among the framers of the
document was that the Articles did not provide the administrative cohesiveness and
executive decision-making authority the thirteen colonies needed to govern successfully.
As a result of this and other concerns, delegates from the thirteen colonies met later in
Philadelphia to re-evaluate the document. The finished product was the Constitution of
the United States of America, which begins:
We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
The United States Constitution and War-Making Authority
One of the most glaring weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation was the
failure to authorize and centralize war-making authority. The framers of the Constitution
sought to clarify the new nation’s war-making authority by changing the monarch
centered approach of the British model and dividing war responsibilities between the
legislative and executive branches of the new American government.
25
The framers drew much of their precedents for the Constitution from British
constitutional history and tradition. In establishing the Constitution, the framers’ primary
concern regarding war-making authority was to remove it solely from the monarch’s
discretion.1 The monarch’s authority to send subjects into war was considered one of the
more tyrannical acts that a sovereign could undertake. The desire to avoid granting war-
making authority to any one officer of the proposed government was the background
against which the Constitution ultimately divided the power to commit the new nation to
war.
The Constitution addressed the locus of war-making authority by granting both
the legislative and executive branches specific, and what most of the framers considered
distinct, war-making responsibilities. On the one hand, Article 1 Section 10 grants
Congress the power to declare war. On the other hand, Article 2 Section 2 grants to the
Executive branch the authority to make war. The grants of authority regarding war to the
legislative and executive branches respectively are supposed to be clear and precise.
However, much of American history has been characterized by what one scholar has
termed the enduring debate over how war should be declared and made through the
authority of the American government. This thesis weighs in on the debate.
1. Louis Fisher, Consitutional and Politcial Basis of War and the Militaty: The Oxford
Cainpanion to American Militaiy History, http:www. Oxfordreference. cornlpages/sarnples-03 Louis Fisher
[accessed June 12, 2009].
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The Constitutional Context: A Distinction without a D~fference or an Unambiguous
Construction
Why does the debate over war-making authority continue in the face of the
specific clauses in the Constitution? Do the clauses speak unambiguously to the
allocation of the authority to wage war or are there differences in the two clauses that are
apparent but fundamentally insignificant? If the latter is true, why have courts,
government officials, and scholars viewed this matter with such interest? To answer
these questions, we have to think about the human and economic devastation created by
war; the political turmoil which grips the nation in the wake of war; and our inability to
understand how the nation continues to fight wars, that over the long term, the public
does not support. The foregoing concerns are especially relevant with respect to both the
Vietnam and Iraq Wars under study here.
Article 1 Section 10 of the Constitution grants to Congress the authority to declare
war. Article 2 Section 2 delegates to the President of the United States the authority to
use military force in response to threats to national security and foreign policy of the
United States.2 Given that both the executive and legislative branches have grants of
authority with respect to different aspects of waging war, the enduring debate can best be
characterized as to whether or not the President can commit the nation to war without the
consent of Congress. Extrapolating from Article 2 Section 2, the executive branch has
claimed, in recent years, that the President can commit to and execute war without
congressional consent in spite of Congress’ constitutional authority to declare war.
2. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constutional Law, 2~~d ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2005), 327-33 1.
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During the modern presidency, not only have presidents argued for their right to
initiate and execute war, they have in some instances actually started wars without
congressional approval. In general, the executive branch has employed three arguments
to initiate war without the consent of the Congress. The first is the President’s obligation
to respond to emergency situations, justified by Article 2 Section 2, which several
presidents have then used as a pretext to move deeper into military conflict. This was the
approach that President Harry Truman used to initiate the Korean conflict. Second,
modern presidents have broadly interpreted perceived foreign threats to American
interests and have asserted their duty to protect these vital interests. The vital interest
argument was one of several claims pressed by President Lyndon Johnson in order to
expand what was already a covert action into a full blown war. Third, presidents have
cited their obligations to honor treaties to defend other nations that were parties to the
treaty in question again, skirting Constitutional restrictions.
In a slightly different but similar vein, presidents have also used United Nations
resolutions as justification for initiating military conflict. The elder President Bush, for
example, claimed that he could take offensive action against Iraq, after its invasion of
Kuwait, without authorization from Congress. The first Bush Administration regarded a
UN Security Council resolution adopted November 29, 1990 as sufficient legal basis.
While contemplating air strikes in Bosina in 1993, President Clinton looked to the
Security Council and NATO for authority, and not Congress.3
3. Fisher, Consitutional and Politcial Basis of War, http:www.Oxfordreference.corn/
pages sarnples-03 Louis Fisher [accessed June 12, 2009].
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It is important to note that the elder President Bush and President Clinton both
took steps to initiate war even after Congress had passed the War Powers Act in 1973.
Subsequent to securing the Tonkin Gulf resolution from Congress, President Lyndon
Johnson argued that in the resolution Congress had authorized him to take the additional
steps necessary to protect American interest and to honor the Southeast Asia Defense
Treaty. In the 1970s, Congress, dissatisfied with President Johnson’s expansion of the
Vietnam War, sought to place tighter constraints on the Presidents’ war-making
authority. The result was the War Powers Act passed by Congress in 1973. However,
the actions of the first President Bush and President Clinton demonstrate that neither the
War Powers Act nor the power of Congress to declare war have been effective constraints
on the Executive’s power to initiate war. In a government of checks and balances, how
and why does the imbalance in Executive war-making authority continue not only to exist
but to grow?
The Debate: A Distinction without a Djfference or an Unambiguous Mandate
The Constitution clearly delegates to Congress the authority to declare war in
Article 1 Section 10 and to the Executive the authority to use military force in response to
threats to national security and foreign policy of the United States. Does the
Constitution, however, make a sharp distinction between the powers of Congress and
those of the President relative to declaring and making war or does the Constitution give
an ambiguous war-making mandate to each branch? After carefhl scrutiny of the United
States Constitution, scholars and policy makers alike have arrived at different answers to
the foregoing questions, and as shown later in the case studies presented here, have had
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dramatic and often devastating consequences resulting from the initiation of wars as
instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
A recent federal government official in the debate over the war-making authority
of the President of the United States has been John C. Yoo, who is a constitutional
scholar, a former appointee of President George W. Bush, and a self-acclaimed
beneficiary of the more expansive interpretation of Presidential war-making authority.
Yoo is a Korean born Professor of Law at UCLA Berkley and former Deputy White
House Counsel in the younger President Bush’s administration. Yoo has indicated that
he and his parents benefited directly from President Harry Truman’s use of force, in the
absence of Congressional approval, against the communist in South Korea because
without aggressive action by the United States. According to Yoo, he and his parents
were able to get out of Korea and come to the United Sates escaping communist
domination because of the unauthorized action taken by President Truman. As a
supporter of military action in the face of external threat, John Yoo was the author of the
memorandum justifying President Bush’s authority to pursue the war against terrorists.4
Yoo’s memorandum is actually a thirty-five page treatise on presidential war-
making authority. It outlines and addresses many of the issues essential to understanding
why presidents have exceeded their constitutionally granted war-making powers. Yoo’s
arguments also provide a constitutional context for examining the views of scholars who
object to his interpretation of the war-making powers of the president. The thoughtful
4. John Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against
Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Washington, DC: Office of Legal Counsel, 2001), 23.
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assertions outlined in Yoo’s memorandum to President George W. Bush are certainly
worth perusal.
Yoo makes several points essential to an understanding of Presidential war-
making authority during modern presidencies and his arguments frame the constitutional
debate over executive war-making authority. The major lines of reasoning focus on
original intent, the role of the commander in chief, historical practice and precedents, and
legislative acts granting war-making authority.5
Yoo’s argument supporting the President’s authority to declare and conduct war
can be summed up in five points:
1. Yoo states that commentators who argue that vesting the power to declare war
gives Congress the sole authority to decide whether to make war misread the
constitutional text and misunderstand the nature of a declaration of war.
2. The Founding Fathers understood very well that declarations of war were
obsolete. He refers to the fact that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
most nations, including America and Great Britain, were often engaged in
hostilities without declaring war. Therefore, Congress had no need to be
involved in the declaration of war.
3. The Constitution allocates different powers to both the Congress and the
President. The President, as Commander in Chief, has specific hegemony over
particular war time activities such as high level negotiation with the leaders of
allies or enemies and the Congress asserts itself through control of funding
and has the latitude to declare war without following a specific process.
4. The Constitution, as written, requires that any ambiguities in the allocation of
a power that is executive in nature such as the power to declare hostilities
must be resolved in favor of the executive branch.
5. From the very beginning of the Republic, the endowment of the Executive
with treaty powers is part of the president’s plenary control over the conduct




It would be difficult to categorize or summarize separately the rebuttals to each of Yoo’s
points because many of the points are interrelated. For example, original intent is a
concept that seems to habitually re-occur in the discussion of most of the positions he
takes, mainly because the Founders themselves touched on them in the Constitution,
either directly or indirectly. Therefore, this paper highlights original intent and the
dilemma it poses when a president declares war as stated in Article 2 Section 2. There
are other re-occurring concepts that bear discussion as well and will become apparent as
this discussion unfolds and will buttress the rebuttals to Yoo’s argument.
As another case in point, the issue of precedents is linked to most all the issues of
contention that are discussed in Yoo’s book. Precedence addresses actions that
Commanders in Chief have taken and justified simply because their predecessors took the
same or similar action, whether legal or not. In this instance, most presidents rationalize
their right to initiate war without Congressional approval because President Harry
Truman went to war in Korea based on a unilateral decision. Yet, when studying an issue
as serious as war making authority, one must ask if repeating an illegal act makes it legal.
During the research for this thesis, no definitive answer was found to the
conundrum ofprecedence. However, the courts in some cases, while not declaring acts
based on precedents unconstitutional, have not prohibited them either. It is therefore
difficult to understand how acceptable arguments for the use of precedence actually are
and how worthy they are of discussion here. Other salient arguments presented by Yoo
regarding the powers of the president to act without congressional authorization during
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war time provide a basis for the rebuttals provided by other Constitutional scholars with a
different point of view.
Making Relevant Distinctions: Originallntent and the Authority to Declare War
Rebuttals to Yoo’s Constitutional points can be characterized in two ways. First,
many legal scholars do not find Yoo’s arguments in favor of unitary executive authority
during times of war convincing. For example, J. Gregory Sidak in a 1991, seventy-page
article in the Duke Law Review, summarizes the views of eleven legal scholars he calls
the Koh signatories. This is a group of law professors who signed a petition of complaint
that was sent to members of Congress designed to stop the elder Bush from taking
unilateral executive action in the Persian Gulf. Second, much ofYoo’s argument goes to
the specific historical points that constitute the historical refutation of the presidential
prerogative to initiate war.
Sidak says both he and the Koh signatories, led by Harold Koh of Yale, believe
that the elder President Bush did not have Constitutional authority to order armed forces
to make war in Iraq “absent meaningful consultation with and genuine approval by
Congress.”7 Sidak also quotes Professor John Hart Ely, not known as a strict
constructionist. Ely states that original understanding and intent of the Constitution’s
framers and ratifiers are often unclear; in the case of the War Clause, for which the
wording is deemed ambiguous by many, Ely emphasizes that “It [the Constitution] is
7. Sidak, “To Decaire War,” 35.
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not.”8 According to Ely, the Constitution speaks unambiguously on the authority to
declare war, and that authority resides solely in Congress.
Sidak concludes his argument by noting that nothing short of a formal declaration
of war by Congress meets the standards of a representative government. Further, he
points out that Congress’ failure to formally declare war allows it to avoid responsibility
for its actions as wars become increasingly difficult and costly.9 As will be revealed, an
attempt to claim that a Congressional resolution is the equivalent of a declaration of war
generally creates problems for the Congress, the President, and the nation.
Other observations about Congress’ authority to declare war emanated from the
experience of the Vietnam War. William Aistyne reviewed Congress’ war making
authority within that context and reached conclusions that support others cited in this
paper. Aistyne makes several points counter to Yoo’s argument, among them that in the
absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the President may not sustain the
engagement of force abroad for any purpose whatever’0.
Aistyne, unlike most other scholars, believes that the interim use of force solely to
repel an invasion of the United States or to relieve citizens from an existing attack is an
authorized use of Executive war power granted by the Constitution. . . the constitutional
authorization of emergency war power of immediate self-defense terminates upon
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. William Altyne, “The President and the Power to Declare War,” A Requiem for University of
Pennsylvania Law Review (November 1972): 13.
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opportunity and failure of Congress to sustain it by express delegation.’~ Aistyne does
note, however, that “if the Congress authorizes the initiation of hostilities.., in the conduct
of those authorized hostilities, the Constitutional initiative belongs to the Executive.”
This situation, he concludes, a residual review and control is vested in the Congress
through its prerogative to modify or repeal its declaration of war.
To help elucidate an alternate interpretation of the Constitution, other scholars
have responded to the key areas of contention raised by John Yoo in the September 25,
2001 Memorandum created as a legal justification for the invasion of Iraq. Vigorous and
well-reasoned responses to Yoo’s interpretation of the Constitution relative to original
intent, the role of Commander in Chief; and legislative delegations of war-making
authority have been provided by several scholars. Many of the conflicting viewpoints are
pertinent to the modern presidency and the action taken by Harry Truman prior to the
Korean War.
Charles Lofgren devotes thirty pages to a discussion of the relationship between
original intent and war making power.’2 In reading various interpretations of the
historical records, it appears that most of the dissent over war making authority stemmed
from two concerns: one was whether the power to make war as vested in the Articles of
Confederation was transferred to the new Congress under the new Constitution. A
second concern related to whether the President could enter war without the approval of
Congress. On the matter of Congress’ authority to make and enter war, Lofgren
11. Ibid.
12. Charles Lofgren, “War Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,” Yale
Law Journal 81, no. 4 (1972): 672-702.
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examines what some of the Framers had to say. He proposed that, “During the
Pennsylvania Convention, James Wilson not only equated declaring war and entering
war, but also explicitly foreclosed exercise of the power by the President acting alone.”13
Lofgren concludes, “In short, while one cannot pretend that the matter is beyond all
doubt, it seems plain that knowledge of the theory and practice of war and reprisal would
have helped convince a late-eighteenth Century American that the Constitution vested
Congress with control over the commencement of~
Congressional Delegation of War Authority
Alstyne also addresses the issue of Congress’ capacity to delegate its war making
authority. As with original intent, the delegation of war making authority by Congress
touches on several other constitutional issues. The role of the Commander in Chief and
the Senate’s role in the treaty confirmation process are related to the question of whether
or not the Congress can delegate its war making authority. Several Presidents have
claimed that during a crisis resulting from military hostilities against the United States,
the Congress can delegate to the President its war making powers. The delegation of war
making authority is most likely to occur when the President has to execute his role as
Commander in Chief or he is required to honor a treaty designed to protect the signatories
from military attack. President George H. W. Bush made this claim during the Gulf War




One such foreign alliance was the Southeast Asia Common Defense Treaty,
which according to Alstyne, declared that “each signatory will act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its Constitutional process.” The author concludes that rather
than empowering the President to undertake the use of military force, the Treaty sets an
international contractual obligation obliging Congress to make a declaration of war if it
intends to fulfill the treaty commitment.’5 Alstyne also examines whether the Congress
can give to the President its war making authority other than through treaty.
Aistyne finds no defmitive conditions, including treaties, under which Congress
can give its war making authority to the President. Quoting Professor Bickel of Yale
University, the author agrees that the ability to grant war power to the President is within
the purview of Congress “provided only (but importantly) that it not be without
standards, the absence of which short circuits the lines of responsibility of Congress to
resolve the necessity and appropriateness of war as an instrument of national policy at
any given time is uniquely not delegable at all.”6
In rebuttal to Yoo, it is also essential to consider whether the role of Commander
in Chief allows the President to assume war making authority without Congressional
approval. The issue is somewhat complicated because the Constitution does give the
President the authority to take military action to defend the United States from attack.
Most scholars and defenders of congressional prerogatives concede that in military
emergencies, the President does have the authority to initiate military action. However,
scholars also point out that Yoo and others have failed to adequately perceive the limits
15. Altyne, “The President and the Power to Declare War,” 14.
16. Ibid.
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of the Commander in Chiefs role. Further, it is important to note that the War Powers
Act passed by Congress in 1973 was designed to clarifS’ the circumstances under which
the President can conduct war, thereby putting to rest the debate between the Congress
and the Executive over the latter’s authority to declare war. Defenders of presidential
authority like President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and John Yoo
have claimed that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional.
On the matter of the role of the Commander in Chief, it is evident that the
Founders never intended the role to be interpreted as broadly as it has been by modern
presidents. The President was named Commander in Chief only to ensure civilian control
over the military. In the Federalist papers, according to Savage, Alexander Hamilton, a
supporter of a strong presidency, considered the title Commander in Chief to be no more
than the “first general” in the military hierarchy. ‘~ Writing on this notion, Schlesinger
describes how President Franklin Roosevelt came to relish the title Commander in Chief
and to prefer it over the title President. One result according to Schlesinger “was to
charge that once technical office with potential”8 in an attempt to claim that it had more
formal power than it actually did. Even the Supreme Court in 1942 had to remind
Roosevelt that “the Constitution invests the Commander in Chief with the ability to wage
war that Congress has already declared and to carry into effect all laws passed by
17. Charles Savage, Takeover: The Return ofthe Imperial Presidency (New York: First Manier
Books, 2008), 63-74.
18. Arthur Schlesinger, The hnperial Presidency (New York: First Manier Books, 1973), 114-
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Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation of the Armed
Forces.”9
In spite of the directive the Supreme Court gave to President Roosevelt, President
Truman proceeded to invest the Commander in Chief with the power that future
Presidents would try to exercise. Savage notes that Truman, for the first time in
American history, asserted that the title Commander in Chief brought with it the
unwritten power to take the country into a major overseas war on his own. It was in the
role of Commander in Chief that Truman took control of the steel industry to avert a
strike that he said would cripple the nation’s war effort. The Supreme Court struck down
Truman’s order as unconstitutional. It noted that “the Founders of this nation entrusted
the lawmaking power to Congress alone in both good and bad times.”20
The War Powers Act: The End ofthe Debate?
Congress’ most recent effort to reassert its war making power was the War
Powers Act of 1973. As previously noted, the Congress passed the War Powers Act to
further clarify how the President should exercise authority in time of war. The majority
of Congress considered it important to outline a process in order to avoid a recurrence of
the kind of legal circumstances under which the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was employed
as a pretext to expand the Vietnam War without congressional approval.
However, both supporters and opponents of a more expansive view of presidential
war authority agree that the War Powers Act is ineffective. John C. Yoo, speaking
19. Ibid.
20. Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency, 63-74.
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generally on behalf of the executive branch and specifically for the Bush administration,
makes it clear that the War Powers Act is not an effective constraint on the President.
According to Yoo, “The executive branch consistently has taken the position from the
very beginning that the. . . War Powers Resolution does not constitute a legally binding
definition of Presidential authority to deploy our armed forces.”2’
Even Arthur Schlesinger acknowledges that the critical element in the War
Powers Act that was designed to rein in the President before he committed the nation to
war is flawed. The War Powers Resolution “gives presidents blanket legal authority to
send troops into battle whenever he found in his own, personal independent, power, and
unchecked judgment a “direct and imminent threat” of attack against American forces
and citizens.”22 The 30-day deadline to the War Powers Resolution simply gives
presidents 30 days to persuade the media and the American people as to why the United
States should participate or support a particular war effort. Research shows that most key
facts and data from most wars are interpreted or received much later than 30 days into a
war. Therefore, key information would not be ready for Congress to analyze and make
such an important decision, such as declaring war into a foreign land. Indeed, there is a
pervasive misconception regarding presidential authority within the context of the War
Powers Act. Schlesinger re-affirms the following:
The 30 day provision virtually compelling{ congress} to support the president
is a hoax by empowering the president to keep the war going beyond thirty
days if he would only certify in writing that he was doing so because of
21. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority, 23
22. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, 433-435.
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“unavoidable military necessity” connected with the disengagement of
American troops.23
At the time the War Powers Resolution was passed, it was meant to limit presidential
discretion in the future, since the U.S was slowly coming out of the Vietnam War.
Ironically, it actually expanded presidential power by granting presidents the ability to
enter into war with out congressional consent.
In retrospect, the four conditions of the War Powers Act would have permitted
President Johnson to enter into Vietnam with congressional approval because the United
States was involved in Vietnam to stop the spread of communism. During the Cold War,
U.S. foreign policy reflected an imperative born of Cold War anxieties and it was
considered crucial to defend American territory, forces, or citizens from sudden attack by
communist forces. 24 The assumption is that the War Powers Act, had it existed in 1962,
would have dispelled doubts about the President’s authority to declare war on North Viet
Nam.
The War Powers Resolution played a large part in the ability of President Bush to
send troops to fight in Iraq after the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and
Washington, DC. The disbursement of troops to Iraq was seen as necessary to defend
American territory, forces, and citizens from further attacks on the homeland. The War
Powers Resolution, therefore, gives the president the legal wherewithal to do whatever he




The analysis of the historical interpretation and constitutional context of
presidential war authority makes several points very clear. The Founders intended that
Congress has the power to declare war. The President is authorized to make and execute,
but not declare war. Most scholars agree that Congress cannot delegate its authority to
declare war. Treaties require that the signatories execute their obligations in accordance
with their own constitutionally prescribed processes, which in the United States requires
congressional approval if the treaty would take the nation to war. Finally, even in the
midst of congressional efforts to acknowledge and clarify presidential emergency war
authority, modem Presidents have rejected the notion that they must obtain Congressional
approval to commit troops to foreign hostilities.
Considering the clarity with which the Constitution speaks regarding both
congressional and presidential war authority, how have presidents been able to take the
nation into the two most devastating foreign conflicts since World War II? To further
examine this question, this study considers the Vietnam War under President Johnson and
the Iraq War under President Bush and focuses on those factors that should constrain
presidential war authority. In part, comparative case studies are used to try to determine
the common factors that allowed presidents to avoid constitutional constraints and other
elements in a representative government that insure that the voices of the public are
acknowledged in making serious decisions like committing a democratic nation to war.
CHAPTER III
PRESIDENTIAL WAR AUTHORITY AND THE VIETNAM WAR
In addition to Constitutional constraints, this thesis examines three other factors to
determine the influence they exerted on President Johnson’s decision to initiate war in
Vietnam in August of 1964. The factors examined are ideology, Congress, the media and
public opinion. To more sharply focus this study, the thesis will examine how each of the
foregoing factors influenced the President’s decision leading up to the passage of the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which served as a formal declaration of war against North
Vietnam.
The anti-Viet Nam protests in the United States from the mid to late 1960s are not
considered here because scholars who have studied the Tonkin Gulf Resolution have
generally concluded that it gave the President the authority to expand hostilities as he
deemed appropriate. It is also important to note that Congress later conceded that it had
granted the President broad authority to conduct the war. Therefore, the essence of the
inquiry here is how and why, given the long history of fairly covert U.S. involvement in
Vietnam that began during the Kennedy administration, did Congress grant the President
exceptional authority to initiate a war that was ill conceived and that eventually drew the
ire of legislators, the media, and the public?
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The Role of Ideology
Especially since the advent of the War on Terror, the Cold War for many
Americans is a distant memory and some have no recollection of it at all. The Cold War
was characterized by a vehement disgust and fear of communism and found its most
virulent expression during the McCarthy trials of the fifties. Although the Soviet Union
and the United States were allies during WWII, they never trusted each other. When
Stalin divided Berlin following WWII and the Russians became a nuclear power,
America and the Soviet Union entered the Cold War. Later in 1949, when the
communists took control of mainland China, the latter also became America’s enemy in
the Cold War.
Today anticommunism is still a small but less important component of American
foreign policy. The only two countries the United States views with distrust because they
have communist governments are Cuba and North Korea. Cuba is not considered a
military threat and North Korea is viewed as a threat but mainly because it is considered a
rogue state. In fact, the United States now has relatively cordial relations with the nations
that it once considered complicit in the effort to overthrow the South Vietnamese
government. These nations include Russia, China, and of course, North Vietnam.
The change in the nature of the relationship between the United States and Russia,
China and North Vietnam respectively shows the powerful role that anti-communist
ideology once exerted on American foreign policy. In many ways, the Vietnam conflict
served as a proxy war between the United States and its perceived communist
adversaries. Anticommunism was once the lens through which the United States viewed
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other nations in the world as either friend or foe; and in some cases, it was willing to risk
nuclear war with its communist enemies.
The Cold War was characterized in terms of its objectives as a battle for the
minds of the third world Latin America, Africa, and Asia. From 1946 to the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, anticommunism was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.
American engagement in Southeast Asia generally and Vietnam in particular was based
on the domino theory.’ This theory postulated that if one country Laos, Cambodia,
Thailand, or South Vietnam came under communist domination, so would the others.
International legal authority for the American military presence in Vietnam was
buttressed by an agreement called the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, a pact
which required the signatories to come to each others’ defense in the event of military
aggression by communist forces against any member state.2 The events in the Tonkin
Gulf between July 30 and August 4 of 1964 were deemed sufficient to meet the terms of
the treaty. Subsequent to the events which produced the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and
after a military presence of almost twenty years assisting the South Vietnamese resist
communist domination, the United States officially declared war against North Vietnam
onAugust7, 1964.~
1. Barbara Tuchman, The March ofFolly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Ballantine Books,
1984), 247.
2. Ernest K. Lindley, The Winds ofFreedom. Selections of the Speeches and Statements of
Secretary ofStale Dean Rusk, January 1961-A ugust 1962 (Boston: Baecon Press, 1963), 177-178.
3. Tuchrnan, The March ofFolly, 247.
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Congress and the Tonkin GulfResolution
Following several military encounters between North Vietnamese and U.S. Naval
forces, President Lyndon Johnson sought and obtained a joint resolution from Congress
formally declaring hostilities between the United States and North Vietnam. A better
understanding of what actually happened between July 30 and August 4, 1964 will help
to illuminate just how the Congress, the media, and the public influenced or failed to
influence President Johnson’s decision to initiate war against North Vietnam. Most of
the criticism and attention on the Vietnam War focuses on what happened after August
1964. But overlooked in those post-August 1964 assessments is any manifestation of
congressional, media, or public influence or criticism as is expected in a democracy,
especially concerning crucial policy matters. Additionally, some observers have recently
concluded that it was the military draft as much as moral disgust over U.S. actions in
Vietnam that led to the public outcry.4
Uncertain Intelligence
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have debated about the accuracy of reports
regarding what happened in the Tonkin Gulf between July 30 and August 4, 1964. Some
have gone so far as to say that the executive branch lied to the Congress or at least
embellished the truth to make the situation more serious than it actually was. While there
may have been some embellishment, the record of events taken from several sources
4. Nathaniel R. Jackson, Ph.D., Interview by author, Atlanta, GA, November 6, 2008.
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indicates that as Mark Lowenthal points out, U.S. intelligence is generally uncertain.5
The Gulf of Tonkin incidents incorporated all the features of the uncertainty of
intelligence and how uncertainty influences policy decisions. In the Tonkin Gulf, some
clouded in uncertainty, led the President to request a joint resolution from the Congress
and significantly contributed to congressional interpretation of the events and the
adoption of the resolution.
In the summer of 1964, the United States Navy and the South Vietnamese were
conducting discrete military operations in the Tonkin Gulf, within proximity of the
territorial waters ofNorth Vietnam. At the same time, the United States was conducting
an intelligence gathering operation called the De Soto patrol. The Navy Destroyer
Maddox, a De Soto patrol eventually attacked by the North Vietnamese, was actively
engaged in intelligence gathering. The South Vietnamese were conducting A-34
operations in order to spot evidence ofHanoi’s continuing infiltration of men and war
supplies into South Vietnam by sea.6
The military events that directly led to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution began on July
30, 1964 when the South Vietnamese launched an attack off the shores ofNorth Vietnam.
According to President Johnson, U.S. naval forces were 120 miles from the site of South
Vietnamese A-34 attacks and were not engaged in supporting the South Vietnamese.7
The latter statement is supported by the fact that presidential scholar Michael Beschloos’
5. Mark M. Lowenthal, “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,” CQ Press, A Division of
C’ongressional Quarterly (2006): 146.
6. Lyndon B. Johnson, Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (Austin : Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 113.
7. Ibid.
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edition of the White House Tapes, dated 1963-1964, shows that no reference was made to
the July 30 incident by President Johnson or members of his administration. In fact, the
administration was preoccupied with the selection of a running mate for Johnson for the
upcoming campaign.8
A second South Vietnamese attack took place on August 3, when the De Soto
patrol was at least 70 miles away, according to President Johnson.9 More importantly,
however, on August 2 and 3, the Johnson administration received reports that two
American ships, the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy, had been attacked by North
Vietnamese patrol boats in two separate incidents. 10 The two American ships were told
to assert the right of freedom of the seas and returned fire. In future writings, critics
would charge that the Johnson administration provoked the North Vietnamese to attack
and then used the second attack as a pretext for war against North Vietnam.
The first attacks on the American destroyers were passed off as the actions of a
trigger happy North Vietnamese Commander, and a stiff letter to Hanoi from the Johnson
Administration was sent in response to the incident. General Nguyen Dinh Voc, director
of the Institute of Military History in Hanoi, affirmed in 1997 that the assault was a local
commander’s initiative.1’ “We advised the North Vietnamese to be under no
misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any
8. Michael Beschloos, Taking Charge: The Secrect Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 364.
9. Johnson, Vantage Point, 113.
10. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It: As told to Richard Rusk (New York. W.W. Norton & Company,
1990), 444.
11. Beschloos, Taking Charge, 364.
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further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces.”2 With
respect to the first attack by the North Vietnamese, there is no doubt about the accuracy
of what happened.
However, controversy remains over the accuracy of the second attack that
provoked President Johnson to seek the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. It is also on this second
attack that precise intelligence is uncertain. To address the accuracy of the intelligence, it
is important to review as many of the papers, letters, and testimonies of the sources of the
reports as possible. Unfortunately, getting closer to the source, in this instance, does not
resolve the debate. Some reports indicate that there was not a second attack on the
United States ships in the Tonkin Gulf. For example, in 1967, a former naval officer,
John W. White, wrote a letter to the New Haven Register in Connecticut charging that the
second attack did not take place. Lieutenant (JG) White was, at the time, aboard a sea
plane tender and had access to radio messages on the high command circuit. White
wrote, “I recall clearly the confusing radio messages sent at that time by the destroyers,
confusing because the destroyers themselves were not certain that they were being
attacked.’3
Other observers view the incident of the second attack with even more
uncertainty. Siff states that the Maddox, if there was an engagement, fired first, based
upon the approach of the North Vietnamese vessels. Officers aboard the Turner Joy, he
continues, have contended that they saw no attacking boats or firing upon the United
12. Johnson, Vantage Point, 113.
13. Ezra Siff, Why the Senate Slept: The Gulfof Token Resoultion and the Beginning ofArnerica’s
Vietnam War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 15.
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States ship.’4 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara agreed that “the evidence of the
first attack is indisputable. The second attack seems probable but not certain.”5 The
uncertainty regarding the second attack was relayed to President Johnson at the time.
The conversion of uncertain intelligence into policy began when McNamara
received the information on the second attack and relayed it to the President. President
Johnson himself shared McNamara’ s uncertainty about the second attack but never
received any information that ever changed his mind. However, on August 4, 1964,
following a publicly circulated media report that seemed to support the veracity of the
incident, foreign policy advisers to President Johnson decided that they had no choice but
to confirm the attacks, including the second one. 16
The next step in the policy formulation process, based on the uncertainty of the
intelligence about the attacks, was congressional hearings to authorize funds that were
needed for a more aggressive defense of South Vietnam. However, amid the confusion
surrounding the incident, two facts are certain: it is clear that the information that the
Johnson administration used to request the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was at best uncertain;
and that one of the democratic forces that should have served as a check on the
executive’s war power itself felt powerless to act. Except for the officially sanctioned
version of the pivotal point in the Viet Nam War the media had little access to more
objective sources of information. Additionally, many journalists were reluctant to use
information provided by North Viet Nam for fear of being labeled not loyal to the United
14. Ibid.
15. Johnson, Vantage Point, 113.
16. Beschloos, Taking charge, 364.
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States. Given the President’s control over the intelligence apparatus of the nation, the
Congress did not have the independent intelligence at its disposal to effectively question
the actions of the President in a perceived military emergency. Therefore, Siff concludes,
“So through the late summer and fall of 1964 the Senate slept and took no action at the
early stages when the Vietnam tragedy could yet have been aborted.”7
The Congressional Response
Even though Congress did not have independent intelligence regarding the Tonkin
Gulf incident, the documentation shows that Congress, through its leadership, was
regularly informed on the course of military events in Vietnam. President Johnson made
a conscientious effort, before the adoption of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, to keep the
Chairs of the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and the Speaker of the
House informed about the operations of U.S. military forces in Vietnam.’8 Two factors
appear to account for President Johnson’s efforts to keep Congress informed. First, as the
recent Senate Majority Leader, Johnson did not want to engage in war as President
Truman had without the consent of Congress.’9 “Senators and representatives
designated to oversee intelligence operations were fully briefed in January 1964, twice in
June, and again in early August.”2° Second, President Johnson was attempting to
17. Siff, Why the Senate Slept, 15.




develop and retain the votes he needed to pass both his Civil Rights2’ and Great Society22
legislation, and in the process, was trying to alienate as few Senators as possible.
Even with the information they had received prior to the Tonkin Gulf incident,
Senator George McGovern told Siff that “with the exceptions of Senators Morse and
Ernest Guering, Senators did believe that the attacks had occurred, as stated by Johnson’s
spokesman.”23 Were there other aspects of the Tonkin Gulf incident that should have
raised concerns and led more Senators to be more cautious in passing the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution? To answer the foregoing question without attempting to recount the entire
debate, we can focus on two factors. One involves the salient points associated with the
Tonkin Gulf incident that were critical to making a decision about the attacks. The
second is the role and actions of the senatorial leaders in addressing the issues related to
the Resolution.
The key issues that were considered by the Senate during the debate on the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution included the violation of the territorial boundaries ofNorth
Vietnam, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the role of the Commander in
Chief, and the proposed Nelson Amendment.
• North Vietnam ‘s territorial boundaries at sea had been violated by the United
States according to the boundaries recognized by that country. In his initial
speech on August 5, Senator Morse Republican from Oregon had already
termed the United States a provocateur, claiming that U.S. destroyers acted as
backups for South Vietnam naval vessels that were bombarding North
Vietnam territory within three to five or six miles of the North Vietnam coast,
knowing that both Vietnams recognized a 12-mile territorial boundary at
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Siff, Why the Senate Slept, 15.
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sea.24 The Johnson administration’s position was that U.S. ships were in
international waters, and they were not there to support the South Vietnamese
Navy. Secretary of Defense McNamara verified those details in his
presentation to the Senate. 25
• The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, of which the United States was
a part, was depicted in front of Congress as a legal obligation requiring the
United States to come to the aid of the South Vietnamese to further resist
communist aggression by North Vietnam. The debate about international
treaty obligations, in part, was related to the foregoing discussion about which
nation had been the aggressor. If the United States or South Vietnam violated
North Vietnam’s territorial waters, then the former were the aggressors and
the terms of the treaty had not been activated. However, since the
administration, in spite of its doubts about the incident, concluded that the
United States ships had been attacked, then upon request of assistance from
the South Vietnamese, the terms of the treaty did apply.
The Tonkin Gulf affair must be considered not only within the context of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, but also within the broader context of
communist aggression, against which the treaty defended South Vietnam. Secretary of
State Rusk speaking on March 1, 1962 said that “the United States military and economic
assistance and technical advice are being extended to the Republic of {Viet-Nam} at its
request to assist the Vietnamese people to maintain their independence against this
aggression.”26 Rusk also quoted then President John F. Kennedy on the subject of
Communist aggression. “. . . Our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their
independence. If the Communist authorities in North {Viet-Nam), will stop their
campaign to destroy the Republic of {Viet-Nam), the measures we are taking to assist
24. Ibid.
25. Johnson, Vantage Point, 113.
26. Lindley, The Winds ofFreedom, 117-178.
53
your defense efforts will no longer be necessary.”27 It was evident that the executive
branch was committed to defending South Vietnam under the terms of the Southeast
Collective Defense Treaty the only remaining question for most Senators was how much
the administration was willing to risk in defense of South Vietnam. According to Siff:
In an exchange on the floor of the Senate on August 6, 1964, Senator
Brewster asked Senator Fuibright, ‘So my question is whether there is
anything in the Resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve
the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.’ Mr.
Fuibright’s response: ‘There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it that
contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that that is the last thing we would
want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It
would authorize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is necessary. It
does not restrain the Executive from doing it.’ Thus, Senator Fulbright
conceded that the language of S.J. 189 would not prevent the President from
waging war under the enormous power of the resolution.28
• The role andpower of the Commander in Chiefwas being confirmed in the
resolution, according to Fuibright. He added, “We are not giving to the
President any powers he has under the Constitution as Commander in Chief.
We are in effect approving of his use of powers that he has. That is the way I
feel about it.”29 The debate over the Southeast Asia Treaty and the power of
the Commander in Chief are linked and both lay the foundation for the post-
August 7, 1964 turmoil that erupted in the United States in 1965 and 1966.
It is interesting to note that even senators who had doubts about the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, because they feared it would lead to greater and more costly U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, overcame their reluctance by relying on their faith in the
constitutionality of the role of the Commander in Chief. For example, Senator Aiken’s
lack of support for the resolution bothered Johnson: Aikens and Johnson shared a
respectful friendship. In a carefully worded statement, Aikens expressed his position by
27. Ibid.
28. Siff, Why the Senate Slept, 37.
29. Ibid.
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stating, “I sincerely hope that the fears I have entertained over the past few months may
prove to have been groundless. I sincerely hope that the President’s action, taken
evidently in the belief that vigorous action now will save more lives than it will cost, will
prove to be correct.30 He then added, directing his attention to the Commander in Chief,
“Mr. President {President of the Senate}, I shall support the joint resolution even though
I still regard the decision of the President with misgivings. It is a very difficult decision
to make, but I do not believe that any of us can afford to take a position opposing the
President of the United States for exercising the power which we, under our form of
government and through our legislative bodies, have delegated to this office.”3’
• The iVelson Amendment to the Tonkin GulfResolution was proposed on
August 7, 1964. According to Siff, Senator Gaylord Nelson was the only
senator during the entire three days of debate to attempt to clarify by
amendment precisely what the scope and intent of S.J. 189 was, and to create
a legislative history that would eliminate the necessity of reliance on Senator
Fulbright’s vague and contradictory answers to question from senators over
the past three days. During the debate, several senators seemed to have had
different understandings about what the resolution actually meant and
authorized the President to do in further defense of South Vietnam. 32
Citing differing interpretations by senators on what the resolution meant
for continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Senator Nelson concluded “in
any event I am most disturbed to see that there is no agreement in the
Senate on what the joint resolution means. I would like to see it clarified.
I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we
in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at
this time to change our mission and substantially expand our commitment.
If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I
therefore ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent






The Congress also supports and approves the efforts of the President to
bring the problem of peace in Southeast Asia to the Security Council of
the United Nations, and the President’s declaration that the United States,
seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to
provocation in a manner that is ‘limited and fitting.’ Our continuing
policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and
military advice and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked
to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct
military involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict.
This amendment, Nelson continued, is not an interference with the
exercise of the President’s constitutional rights. It is merely an
expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the
amendment? According to Siff, in what he later conceded was one of
the greatest mistakes of his career, Fuibright refused to accept the
amendment. ~ Nelson stated that “I was urged to withdraw my
resolution to avoid the necessity for a conference between the Senate
and House on two version of the resolution.35
Sleeping Giants
If, in the metaphorical words of Ezra Siff, the Senate slept during the pivotal time
leading up to the Vietnam War, what stance did the most powerful and more esteemed
members of the Congress, such as Speaker of the House Mike Mansfield, William
Fulbright, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Richard Russell, Chair of the
Armed Services Committee adopt? Do historical records shed any light on what these
distinguished Congressmen thought about American involvement in Vietnam prior to
August 7, 1964 and were these and other members supportive of greater involvement in
Vietnam as indicated by their support of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution?
The White House Tapes, in the Johnson administration recorded in the years




the war effort. “I do not conclude that our nation’s interests are served by deep military
involvement in Southeast Asia.”36 He strongly recommended that the Johnson
Administration make a conscientious effort to explain to the American people the
purpose and nature of the United States’ support for South Vietnam. He added, “If the
decision must be for our continuance on the course which is leading to deeper
involvement, however, I would most respectfully suggest that the basis for these
decisions must be made more clearly and persuasive to the people of this nation than has
heretofore been the case.”37 In spite of his reservations, Mansfield ultimately voted in
favor of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, as did William Fulbright.
Sometime after 1964, Fuibright became closely associated with those opposing
American involvement in Vietnam. However, on March 2, 1964, President Johnson
explained to the senator exactly what the administration considered its options in
Vietnam. Fulbright eventually agreed with the fourth alternative, which was “to continue
our present policy of providing training and logistical support for the South Vietnamese
forces.”38 Such must have been the power of Johnson’s influence on the senator,
however, that on August 7, as mentioned before, Fulbright literally refused to accept any
alternative to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and thus, was instrumental in supporting the
President and approving the expansion of the war with a formal declaration.
Perhaps the Congressman who exerted the greatest influence over President
Johnson was Senator Richard Russell, a fellow Southern Democrat from Georgia.




Russell had helped to mentor Johnson when he first came into government, and when
Johnson served as a member of the Senate from Texas. Russell had privately opposed
U.S. involvement in Vietnam before Johnson became President.39 The White House
Tapes, again from the years 1963-1964, show that Senator Russell wanted to fmd a way
out of Vietnam. He actually made two proposals for withdrawal.
First, he recommended installing a South Vietnamese leader who would be in
favor of U.S. withdrawal under the guise of the South Vietnamese right to self-
determination, which the United States would honor.4° Second, he suggested that a
public opinion poii be taken in Vietnamese cities on whether American help was wanted
and if the results were negative, the United States should withdraw.4’ It appears that
Russell was a hawk on Vietnam in public, but he was privately opposed to the war.
Russell’s vote, which indicated no opposition to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, belied his
private misgivings. In the end, not even the giants of the Senate who opposed the war
tried to stop the Tonkin Gulf Resolution; it passed unanimously in the House and 88-2 in
the Senate.
As indicated by historical records, Congress did not exercise its constitutional
responsibility regarding the Vietnam War. This thesis next examines the role of the
media in the events leading up to the start of the Vietnam War as well as its role during
and after what some would say was a costly fiasco. The vehement media opposition to
the Vietnam War from 1965 forward is in stark contrast to a much more compliant
39. Tuchrnan, The March ofFolly, 329.
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attitude in the media prior to August 7, 1964. It is therefore helpful to the main premises
to identify and explain some of the factors that contributed to the media’s variety of
perspectives about the power of the executive branch, the Tonkin Gulf crisis and other
aspects of the Vietnam War. While not monolithic, on the whole, the media did not at
first aggressively oppose deeper American involvement in Vietnam, but as time went on,
support dwindled. There never was the overwhelming support for the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution and other aspects of the war anyway within the media again, in direct
contrast to the tentative but nearly complete support for the war by members of Congress.
However, for a variety of reasons discussed below the media prior to 1964 did not have
the access to information required to intelligently oppose the war and other members of
the media were afraid to do so because they did not want to appear disloyal, which they
knew would have completely cut them off from the official sources of government
information that were available.
The Media in the Initiation of the Vietnam War
The Media and Democratic Theory
Americans are taught that we have established a government for the people, of the
people, and by the people. Consequently, according to American theory of government
and generally accepted democratic principles, the people can exercise significant
influence over government decisions. Additionally, the notion of the media as the Fourth
Estate has also found its way into democratic theory. The Fourth Estate is a broad
concept that refers to any institutional entity within a society that interacts with,
supplements, or serves as a check on government. In some countries, the Fourth Estate is
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considered to be the people themselves. However, in the United States, it refers to the
media and serves as a watch dog on the United States Government. Supposedly, the
media serves as a check on the exercise of government authority. Such notions are
widely held throughout American society, even though the most vocal elements of the
public consider the media biased toward one end of the political spectrum or the other.
Considering how most Americans view the media and its role vis-à-vis
government, did the media, as the fourth estate, play its watch dog role at the beginning
of the Vietnam War? Did the media compensate for what the Congress had failed to do
in closely scrutinizing the executive branch as the President took more deliberate steps to
officially commit the United States to the military support of the South Vietnamese, thus
formally entering war with North Vietnam? Finally, what does the historical record say
about the ability of the media to constrain the use of presidential power to initiate war?
One of the implicit tenets of democratic theory suggests that institutions closest to
the people should exercise the most influence over important decisions that affect the
people. Within that context, the Congress, especially the House of Representatives, and
the media should be able to influence executive decisions. A close examination of the
Congress and its role in the declaration of war shows that Congress only had the
information that the executive provided through intelligence briefings or the appearance
of administration officials before the Congress. Similarly, our analysis of the media
during the early phases of the Vietnam War shows that for official information, the media
was also dependent upon the executive branch, especially the President. Therefore, the
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President’s control over the venue and agenda for dispensing information on the Vietnam
conflict allowed him to shape the views of the media.
The Contextfor Media Influence during the Vietnam War
Scholarly research has yielded valuable insights regarding why the news media
reacted as it did to the key events leading to a deeper engagement in Southeast Asia.
First, as the Fourth Estate, newspapers, journals, television and radio are considered a
major influential set of institutions, acting as a check and balance for all areas of
governance. Some question if this is the role the media assumed regarding this conflict.
Second, the media on a more realistic level should be challenged about how information
concerning the war was dispersed. Sometimes the choices media made or the positions
advocated regarding the war were not what the American people always expected or even
accepted, based on what the role of media theoretically should have been as a watchdog.
A third consideration is true objectivity about the war as portrayed in the various media,
especially since, to some degree, the media is subject to government control through
regulatory guidelines. Finally, it appears that the media at least during this period did not
assume its role as an advocate for constraint regarding expanded presidential powers to
declare war.42
Much of the analysis of the role of the Fourth Estate emanated from the many
analyses of the Vietnam era. At least some of the close scrutiny of the media about its
role, especially during war time, seemed to become more intense as an indirect result of
its inaction at the beginning of the Vietnam War. Furthermore, there appears to be a
42. James Reston, The Arillery Press: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy (New York:
Haper & Row, 1967), 45.
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general consensus that the media did not assume its proper function as an overseer of
both the democratic process and the constitutional limits of presidential power.
Journalists and political scientists view as relevant an understanding of the interplay
between the government and media. Since the Vietnam War, the role of the media during
the early phase of the Viet Nam War has been critically analyzed. Here, by way of
example, are cited the works of two individuals. To more clearly conceptualize the
analysis the writer adopts several distinct categories that were provided by the sources
cited: theory versus practice, the media as an objective institution, the role of presidential
power, the role of official sources, the news worthiness of the president, the role of
interpretation or analysis, the focus on immediate events rather than the broader context
in which they occur.
Theory versus practice regarding the role of the media has been addressed by a
journalist and a political scientist. After the study of several presidents, Cornwell,
political scientist writing generally about the influence of the media and public opinion,
concluded that the bottom-up model, that is influence over critical decisions moving from
the public up to the president, was not an accurate conception. ~u According to Cornwell,
the public has increasingly viewed the government through the actions of the President.
The President has become the source and stimulus for action. ‘~ “He {President} has
done so by exploiting his unequaled platform for popular leadership. This fact, with a
powerful assist from the burgeoning commercial news media, has virtually transformed
43. Elmer Cornwell. Presidential Leadership ofPublic Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1966), 4-5.
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the White House occupant into the personification of the national government.”45 As
stated earlier, democratic theory holds that the media and public opinion should influence
governmental decisions in a democratic society. In a bottom-up model, both the views of
the media and the opinion of the public exert some influence over the most important
decisions, such as going to war, that presidents make.
Media Access to Information
What is known about the media, its role in a democracy, and the way the media
obtains and verifies the information upon which it relies is of deep concern to most
Americans. It is impossible to divorce the sometimes negative viewpoints about the
media by the public from how the media views its own self. The media believes it has
the capacity to independently obtain information and objectively evaluate it; others say
not. In light of these considerations, the paper presented here will explore and assess
whether the media performed its appropriate role or if it thought its duty was fulfilled in
constraining the President in the initiation of the Vietnam War.
The media as an objective institution, that can and sometimes does exercise
influence concerning the issue of presidential war powers, should assiduously check
sources and expose itself to enough information to make an informed commentary about
key issues. Although in the name of patriotism the media may vacillate, choosing
censorship over transparency, through the power of words and the dispersion of accurate,
objective information, the media can perform its correct duty and in spite of
government restrictions. The media is as objective as the independent information it
45. Ibid.
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receives allows it to be. Especially in foreign policy, media today now has access to all
the advantages of technology. However, in the mid-sixties, determination and footwork
were the watch words. William Dorman, Associate at the Institute of War, Peace, and the
Media and quoted in Kathleen Turners book in 1986 analyzing the Viet Nam War, wrote
in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientist that “The media have moved further and further away
from the watch dog role democratic theory assumed they would play in affairs of state
where national defense and foreign policy are concerned.46
To further enhance an understanding of how government in general and the White
House, in particular controls the news agenda, it is important to consider several general
points regarding government control of and media access to critical information Bill
Moyers, who worked in the White House as President Johnson’s Press Secretary, as well
as in print and broadcast media, emphasized that, “Most of the news on television is,
unfortunately, whatever the government says is news.”
• The White House occupants have long been adept at dishing out the news.
• The sheer quantity of information churned out by the United States
government is a major factor in its ability to set the news agenda. The White
House and Pentagon each host two daily press briefmgs; the State Department
holds one. The White House produces 15 to 20 press releases a day. (The Air
Force alone issued over 600,000 news releases in 1 980---the last year such
statistics were made public.) These are supplemented by interviews, off-the-
record background briefings, leaks, tips, staged events, photo opportunities,
speeches by top officials, and the well-timed release of reports, “white papers”
and other documents.
• As many as 13,000 PR people work for the federal government, at a cost of
more than $2.5 billion a year in taxpayers’ money. Every member of Congress
has a PR staff So does an alphabet soup of government agencies: FDA, EPA,
46. Turner, Lyndon Johnson~s Dual War~ 85.
64
DEA, NASA, etc. Dispatched throughout the hallowed halls of officialdom
are Washington reporters ~whose primary exercise,’ as Alan Abelson of
Barron’s put it, “is collecting handouts from those informational soup
kitchens~
In an era ofexpandedpresidential power, such as during the Vietnam War,
writes James Reston, a prominent journalist during the Vietnam era,
addressing the media’s ability to constrain the President concluded that “the
power of the press and even that of the Congress to restrain the Chief
Executive has declined proportionately since World War II.~~48 In an article
commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations, Reston wrote the
following:
Presidential power in the foreign field is in direct proportion to the size of the
issue. The press can irritate and humiliate him personally. It can embarrass
him by premature disclosure of his plans, and the Congress can still oppose
and even defy him on peripheral issues. But on the great acts of foreign
policy, especially those involving the risk or even the act of war, he is more
powerful in this age than in any other single, freer to follow his own bent than
any other political leader in the world the larger and more fateful the issue,
the greater is his authority to follow his own will. ~
The Media and Public Opinion and the Initiation of the Vietnam War
Compared to its more aggressive reporting about the war post 1965 and beyond,
the news media in the United States was much more muted in its reporting and reticent in
its opposition to greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam. “Journalists kept chomping at the
government bit, even when it should have been apparent that something was seriously
amiss about the official version of the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, which served as a
pretext for dramatically escalating the war in Vietnam. Early calls for U.S. withdrawal
from Vietnam by Senator Ernest Gruening, one of the two dissenting votes against the
47. Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News
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Tonkin Gulf Resolution, went unreported in the New York Times and the Washington
Post.”5°
Kathleen Turner, former journalist at the New York Times in her analysis of
Lyndon Johnson and the media, highlights the apparent absence of media opposition to
President Johnson’s response to the Tonkin Gulf incident. Staff members for Johnson
reported that “the President’s rapid response to North Vietnamese provocation received
overwhelming support from the press, Congress, labor, and Veterans organizations.”5’
and they could point to Turner as evidence. Turner reported that from influential
politicos such as Harry Truman to the powerful Chicago Tribune to Walter Lippman and
the AFL-CIO, diverse and prestigious facets of the American public seemed to approve
of Johnson’s course of action. 52 Such reports could only have convinced President
Johnson that he had made the right decision about Vietnam.
It was several years later before some members of the media, in retrospect, took a
look back at their actions during the Tonkin Gulf incident. Years after the Gulf of
Tonkin, for example, the Los Angeles Times’ Jules Witcover complained that “when the
government reported in August 1964, that two American destroyers had been attacked in
the GulfofTonkin. . . there was no sustained effort to ferret out its veracity. ~ Aroson
extended this criticism when he marveled that reporters at McNamara’ s press conference
on August 5, “refrained from asking any questions that might embarrass the government,





although it must have seemed inconceivable to any thoughtful reporter that a few small
North Vietnamese gunboats would seek out and challenge the battleships of the United
States, knowing that such an action would provoke immediate and massive retaliation.”54
Turner concludes that whatever the reporter’s level of incredulity, few questions
were raised in August of 1964. Quoting the Pentagon Papers, Turner writes, the handling
of the Gulf of Tonkin incident “marked the crossing of an important threshold in the war,
and it was accomplished with virtually no criticism, indeed, with an evident increase in
public support for the administration.”55 It is clear from an assessment of several
sources that document original observations that the American media did not provide
either a critical analysis of the Tonkin Gulf incident or vocally oppose the war as it did in
1965 and beyond. However, an important question remains unanswered; why was the
media so unquestioning about the Tonkin Gulf reports by the government that served as
the formal initiation of the Vietnam War? Answers to this question are found in the
seminal work of Daniel Hallin.
Media Objectivity
Hallin’ s book, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam, is based on the
complete body of the New York Times coverage from 1961-1965. Employing Hallin’s
framework, which is based on the journalistic integrity of a well-respected newspaper,
one can trace the reports on Vietnam leading up to the Tonkin Gulf incident and the




objectivity by analyzing an article by Tom Wicker, published on August 5, 1964, that
covered President Johnson’s television statement on the Tonkin Gulf incident.
Hallin writes that Wicker, using the objective language of journalism, reported
only the facts as presented by President Johnson. Wicker conveyed Johnson’s message as
intended, without interpretation, which provided no opportunity for comment that may
have criticized and opposed the administration’s view of the facts surrounding the Tonkin
Gulf incident.56 Such an outcome results from the elements ofjournalistic objectivity to
which Wiker adhered and include the following:
The use ofofficial sources, according to Hallin, and the injunction to present “just
the facts” leaves the journalist in a difficult position, for in politics, the facts are almost
always to some degree in dispute. ~ Hallin continues, “Indeed, every Times story on the
Gulf of Tonkin that day was based on official U.S. sources exclusively, with the
exception of a two-paragraph section reporting that Hanoi had said that the attack was a
fabrication.”58
Hallin’s study of the Washington Post and New York Times found not only that
most of the sources in the two papers were based only on the information given by
government press contacts and initiated by government officials rather than journalists.
The prefened vehicle was the carefully controlled press conference format or government
authorized press releases. Each of the Times three front page stories on the Tonkin Gulf





incident on this day centered around officially initiated events. Hallin points out that
officials sources fill a vacuum of authority left by the rise of “disinterested realism” ~
The “newsworthiness” of the President overrides all other priorities when he
makes a public appearance, such as when giving an important speech. Hallin reiterates
this point made both by Cornwell and Reston that when an issue is related to a
Presidential decision, he not only dominates the news, he is the news. The Executive
apparatus of government allows the President to exert almost absolute control over his
message, its content, and its delivery. Hallin’s analysis also shows that the Executive
apparatus significantly influences the way journalists cover a selected Presidential
decision and the way the public perceives it. With the Vietnam War, at least at the start,
there was almost absolute control of the message by a very strong-willed and some say,
stubborn president.
There is an Absence ofInterpretation or Analysis that generally precludes
editorializing in news columns that are concerned with issues of great importance. “But
the status of interpretation, what journalist call news analysis, has been ambiguous since
the rise of the ethic of objectivity in the 1960s.”6° Adhering to the ethic of objectivity
places the journalist in a dilemma, Hallin notes. Journalists have resolved this dilemma
by focusing on only the facts that speak for themselves. According to Wicker, the facts
that “spoke for themselves” were what the President conveyed to the press, and in




that most journalists allowed the President to present one version of the incident without
questioning the alleged facts. There were exceptions, however.
Hallin points out that three of the most prestigious journalists of the period, the
two Alsops and James Reston, did analyze and editorialize. However, their analyses
were derived from close connections with and reliance upon government officials. Hallin
asserts that in reality, they served as semi-official voices of government. He concludes
that “analytic reporting generally served as one more channel for the transmission of the
official view. Therefore, supposedly analyzing the Tonkin Gulf incident, Reston wrote,
“. . . the objective of his {the President’s} policy is not to widen the war but to convince
the communist that they cannot win the war, and that their sensible course is to negotiate
an honorable peace.”6’ Reston’s interpretation mirrored the official purpose of the
retaliation: “Washington’s response is limited and fitting and his {Johnson’s}
administration seeks no general extension of the guerrilla war in Southeast Asia.”62
David Haberstam in his extensive work on the American media, The Powers That
Be,63 also reinforces the existence of the close ties between media executives and
government officials during the Vietnam War. In a number of chapters, he analyzes the
close connections between CBS, the Los Angeles Times, Time Inc., the Washington Post,
and officials in the executive branch of government. Haberstam divulges various
episodes in which government officials relayed to journalists how dissatisfied both
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. David Haberstam, The Powers That Be (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000),
459-467.
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Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, at various times, had been with media coverage of the
Vietnam War. Kennedy and Johnson utilized one-on-one sessions with media executives
and journalists to influence their coverage of the war.
The tendency of the media to Focus on Immediate Events is closely related to the
low priority American journalism placed on analysis and interpretation during that
period. Hallin, as a part of his analysis of the Tonkin Gulf incident, proposes that New
York Times journalists failed to use the events of July 23, 30 and August 2, 1964 in the
Tonkin Gulf to provide a richer context for understanding the reported attacks on
August 4, 1964. The omission, according to Hallin, was tied to notions of what
constitutes a relevant event. “By the conventions of objective journalism, none of this
{ the former events} were news in August l964.~~64
President Lyndon Johnson and the Media
“The Radio and Television Report to the American People Following Renewed
Aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin” constituted President Johnson’s first major speech to
the American public specifically addressing the crisis in Vietnam. This type of formal
dialogue with the American public about foreign policy did not occur until eight-and-one-
half months after he had entered office.65 The President decided to make a short
announcement type speech about the Tonkin Gulf incident before the North Vietnamese
or Chinese could interpret the attack in a manner that served their own interests. Since
64. Ibid.
65. Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, 75.
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Johnson was in office several months before he addressed the American public on
Vietnam, how did he communicate through the media during the interim?
The Johnsonian philosophy of press relations was one in which the President
showed disrespect for the institution, but not disdain for its practitioners. He sought to
interact with the press on his own terms, assuming that his actions were justified because
he was the president. Johnson surmised that the media required access, but he provided it
on his terms, which were radically different from both his predecessors and successors.
Johnson, for example, utilized impromptu press conferences to his advantage.
The unplanned news conferences allowed Johnson to dominate the events by
limiting in-depth questions because the media outlets would not have time to assemble
their experts on particular policy issues. The absence of the experts meant that the
reporters present relied on information and versions of events provided by the
President. 66 There was no empirical basis upon which to challenge President Johnson
during news conferences.
Other techniques utilized by President Johnson to control information about the
war included walking news conferences, which were often used when the news media
complained that they had not recently met with the President. While walking through the
grounds of the White House, the President would dispense information on the important
developments in the war to which the government had to respond. The media felt
overwhelmed and exhausted as its members attempted to query because he talked
excessively, even when he gave one-on-one interviews, reducing the time for questions
about Civil Rights, the Great Society and, especially the Vietnam War. Moreover, the
66. Ibid., 83.
72
media was always irritated with the President because they never knew when a
presidential encounter would occur. As a result, they felt obligated to always be in the
press room, which was disruptive to their personal lives. In fact, President Johnson’s
attitude toward the media was summed up in the following statement: “Reporters are
puppets. They simply respond to the pull of the most powerful strings.”67
67. Ibid, 77.
CHAPTER IV
A CASE STUDY OF GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE DECISION TO
INITIATE THE IRAQ WAR
If this paper were written in a discipline other than political science or history, it
would be acceptable, but incorrect, to state that the Iraq War resulted from the 9 11
attacks and the War on Terror. However, it is much more appropriate to note that the
War on Terror is a product of many factors, most ofwhich are connected to Middle East
politics and present a serious challenge as the United States struggles to maintain
harmonious diplomatic relations with oil rich countries in the region. The countries most
involved in the War on Terror include, among others, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, Iran,
Iraq, and Afghanistan. The theological, political, philosophical, and intellectual
traditions of each of these nations has played out against efforts to reconcile a positive
but generally theocratic and conservative interpretation of Islam, as expressed in the
Quran, with the development and adoption of more modem strategies for organizing
societies. 1
Without question, access to oil in the Middle East and the War on Terror
contribute to the tension between the United States and many Islamic nations.
Nevertheless, whether one accepts the clash of civilization thesis, and some astute
observers do not, there are different world views between many in the West and believers
1. Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 315-351.
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in Islam. One of those rejecting the clash of civilization thesis is Robert Fisk who is
based in Syria and writes for the Independent, a newspaper in London. Fisk argues, in a
rather simplistic way, that much of the problem between the two civilizations is more
basic: a matter of belief. The “Islamic East” is composed, for the most part, of nations of
true believers and the West, which is not called the “Christian West,” is a product of the
renaissance and Humanism. Those in the West are, for the most part, individuals who
have wedded modernism to the tenets of Christianity.
In contrast, Rutheven, citing many theological and philosophical traditions in
Islam, is convinced that the root of the problem between Islam and the West is the
absence of an Islamic reformation, a movement that would have allowed Islam to adjust
to modernism, as did the Age of Reason that grew out of the scientific revolution in
sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Nonetheless, rejecting the clash of civilization
thesis, as Fisk does, cannot ameliorate the fact that there are fundamental differences
between the world views of the West and the majority of Muslims and that difference in
viewpoints significantly contributes to tensions between the two cultures.
An example that can assist in understanding the differences in world view is the
existence of clearly divergent opinions about the connection between poverty and
fundamentalism. In the book, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, Owen Bennett Jones speaks
directly to this point, focusing on Pakistan, which is an ally of increasing importance in
the efforts to wage the War on Terror, especially in Afghanistan.2 First, poverty in
Pakistan is a growing concern. Although the middle class has grown in Pakistan, nearly
2. Owens Bennet Jones, Pakinstan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale Univesity Press,
2009), 24-31.
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one-quarter of the population is classified as poor as of October 2006. The trend was first
observed during the 1970s and 1980s and got worse in the 1990s by poor federal policies
and rampant corruption. This phenomenon has been referred to as the poverty bomb.
Second, the rise of poverty in Pakistan has been correlated with the rise of Islamic
Fundamentalism in many parts of the country. The Pakistani government’s attempts at
proposed reforms have been criticized as “weak” and have been associated with an
“expedient brand of romance between the establishment and the religious right.”
Madrassa education, which is a type of religion infused, doctrinaire vehicle of exposure
to the radical world of “Holy Jihad,” is offered to young students on the pretext that such
an approach to learning can provide a more superior learning experience than can be
found in other types of schools. The majority of students attending madrassas are in
poverty because it is their only access to education. The result is often a cadre of willing
young terrorists.
Third, the United States and other western nations fighting in Iraq have also
blamed madrassas for producing Islamic radicals. In Northwest Pakistan and Northeast
Afghanistan, the inhabitants, the Patshun tribe, does not recognize the border between the
two countries and is the locus for the production of Islamic radicals, many ofwhom are
trained in the madrassas because the Pakistani upper-class, that controls the government,
has refused to provide adequate education for the poverty-stricken masses. In turn, the
poverty stricken masses, which constitute two-thirds of the Pakistani population, supply
holy warriors for the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
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The nexus between poverty and fundamentalism clearly suggest that when there
are significant domestic reforms, there will probably be a shortage of Muslims who can
be bated into committing acts of terror.3 The challenge ofunderstanding the Middle
East, a section of the world vital to U.S. interests and a central factor in the investigation
of presidential prerogative in the Iraq War, has ultimately tested the strength and
resilience of U.S. foreign policy.
In discussing the war in Southeast Asia, the researcher described the roles that the
Congress, media, and public opinion played or did not play to constrain the presidential
decision to initiate war in Vietnam. The organizational model employed focused on the
following: the ideology that undergirded U.S. foreign policy, the policy and
Constitutional context, the role of Congress, and the media and public opinion, all within
the paradigm of democratic theory. The same model will be utilized to better understand
presidential decisions to initiate the Iraq War.
The Role of Ideology and Public Policy in Expanding Presidential
Power for the Iraq War
Since the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, followed by the attack on
the Twin Towers in 2001, the United States has found itself on the defensive in an
ideological, cultural, and military confrontation designated the War on Terror. The
antagonistic, proactive ideology that undergirds the War on Terror seems to have
replaced the former balance of power, anti-Communist ideology of the Cold War referred
to in the previous chapter. In fact, it is ironic that Afghanistan, the current hot spot in the
War on Terror, was also the site of the last proxy war between the United States and the
3. Jones, Pakinstan: Eye of the Storm, 24-3 1..
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Soviet Union in the closing battle of the Cold War. Whether or not one has replaced the
other, it is clear that the War on Terror now occupies the place in the American political
imagination once reserved for the cold war. However, the nature of the perceived threat
is considerably different even though both conflicts have assumed military dimensions.
The War on Terror is played out against the religious and economic environment
in Islamic countries that may or may not be allies of the United States. While there were
attacks against the United States and its allies prior to the United States invasion of Iraq,
sometimes it seems that the battle against fundamentalist Islam, which knows no
geographical boundaries and can’t be isolated to any one country may become a
quagmire. In spite of the difficulties in fighting a war against such an enemy, the United
States invaded Iraq to formally initiate the War on Terror and to eliminate weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs) that supposedly would be used by Sadaam Hussein to further
his hegemony in the Middle East.
Regrettably for the sacrifice of the soldiers who gave their lives to prove it, there
were no WMDs, which meant that President Bush found himself as Commander in Chief,
directing a war fought by factionalized Muslims, many of whom were inspired in their
anti-Americanism by devotion to a perverted version of Islam. The President also found
himself fielding expressions of doubt by Americans who were becoming restive about the
war. The enemy, it was soon discovered, was not only located in Iraq but throughout the
Muslim world. This enemy was attracted to Iraq by the United States presence, seen by
many of them as an imperialist invasion based on greed for oil. This realization seemed
to have intensified President Bush’s ideological response, which became a war to make
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Iraq and other countries in the Muslim world safe for democracy and not necessarily a
repository for WMDs.
9/11, the War on Terror, and the Spread ofDemocracy
‘While there were several attacks on U.S. installations prior to 9/11, it was the
attack on September of 2001 that galvanized the American public and its government
around the need to respond to the threats from Islamic fundamentalism. With the
exception of the attack on the World Trade Center, other acts of violence occurred
overseas, the attack on the U.S. Cole in Yemen and the Ghanan and Tanzanian
embassies. However, the attacks on the Twin Towers were perpetrated on American soil
and Americans saw the attacks as they occurred, thus instilling a measure of fear and
disgust that the nation had not experienced since the attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941.
The Bush Doctrine and the National Security Strategy of2002
The attacks on 9/11 generated two substantive responses from the Bush
administration: One response was the establishment of the new government agency of
Homeland Security to protect Americans against further invasions and attacks. The
second response was to declare the War on Terror, which had three specific objectives.
The first objective was to eliminate WMDs that could be used by Saddam Hussein and by
other terrorists. The second objective was to eliminate the terrorists and destroy their
safe havens. The third objective was to make countries that house or might house and
train terrorists more conducive to the development of democracy. Each of the foregoing
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objectives was spelled out in the National Security Strategy for 2002.~ The Security
Strategy for 2002 embodied the US foreign policy objectives for that year, and also
contained what became known as the Bush Doctrine, including its comprehensive
response to the War on Terror.
The Security Strategy was not presented as a holistic document but was explained
in increments by President Bush during a series of public speeches and formal statements
to Congress during 2002. As previously stated, the Security Strategy set the stage for the
approach the US would use to meet the challenge of combating terrorism. The Iraq War,
conducted initially to eliminate WMDs, is never mentioned in the Security Statement.
The absence of Iraq is notable considering that the Security Statement that was made
available to the public is comprised of several different documents prepared and
presented over several months. The first presentation of the anti-terrorist strategy was in
a speech given by President Bush on June 1, 2002. Another is dated March 22, 2002, and
a third is dated May 23, 2002.~
In spite of its absence in any of the documents that constitute the Security
Strategy, Iraq became the focal point of the War on Terror, while Afghanistan, where the
terrorists were actually being housed and trained, was treated with less urgency by the
Bush administration. The failure to address the terrorist threat in Afghanistan led many
observers and members of the public to believe that President Bush’s major reasons for
invading Iraq were to take the oil reserves of the country, and/or punish Saddam Hussein
4. Central Intelligence Aagency (CIA), The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, Briefing (Washington DC: CIA, September 2002).
5. Ibid.
80
for the attempted assassination of the elder President George H.W. Bush. Whatever the
reason, the US diverted its attention from finding and killing terrorists in Afghanistan to
fighting a dangerous land war and trying to promote nation building in Iraq6.
Implementing the Bush Doctrine
To lay the foundation for expanding its power to fight the War on Terror, the
Bush administration had to address both constitutional and policy constraints as it moved
to implement the Bush Doctrine and initiate the Iraq War. Since 1973, the Congress had
sought to limit the President’s war powers through the War Powers Act. Central to the
Bush administration’s effort to expand the President’s power was its move to legitimate
the concept of the “unitary executive” and to modify federal communications laws, which
some thought would lead to infringement on individual privacy. Both the Federal
Intelligence and Security Act (FISA) and the Electronics Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) had to be replaced by the USA Patriot Act, according to the administration, to
further its fight against terrorism. The Bush administration could not strengthen the
executive branch nor pass the USA Patriot Act without either the acquiescence or
approval of Congress.
The Role of Congress in Initiating the Iraq War and Confirming the Bush Doctrine
Some presidents and vice presidents strongly believe in the need to blunt the
authority that congress employs to encroach upon the powers and the responsibilities of
the office of the president. The reasoning is simple: so that presidents and their
6. Nathaniel Jackson, Ph.D., interview by author, Atlanta, GA, November 6, 2008.
81
administrations are able to effectively serve the American people. In the book, The
Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion ofAmerican
Democracy by Charlie Savage, Savage explains how President George Bush and Vice
President Dick Cheney were determined to expand the power of the presidency by
attempting to permanently alter the constitutional balance of the American government so
that their administration and future presidents would have a greater source of power.7 In
this book, Savage describes Vice President Cheney as a man who was determined to
expand the powers of the presidency by reducing the authority of congress and the courts
and to expand the ability of the commander in chief and his top officials to govern with
maximum flexibility and minimum oversight.8
The Bush administration relied not only on the concept of the unitary executive to
expand presidential power, but as with other administrations seeking to go beyond
constitutional limits, it also used precedent. The major precedent upon which recent
presidents have relied to justify expanding their powers has been the Youngstown Sheet
and Tube case. In 1952, President Truman made the claim that as President he had the
authority to prevent workers at the Youngstown Sheet and Tube factory from going out
on strike because it could jeopardize the Korean War effort. The Supreme Court agreed
with President Truman and since that time, Presidents have used the case as a precedent
for extending their own powers, especially during times ofwar. During the Iraq War, the




Bush administration also went back to arguments regarding the unitary executive to
further substantiate its authority to expand presidential power.
As a practical matter, the notion of the unitary executive has been addressed by
the Supreme Court, citing the restrictions of the Constitution. In other words, cases and
issues presented by the executive branch have been judged by the Supreme Court as a
separation of powers issue. This means that courts have viewed efforts to extend the
powers of the executive beyond the boundaries set by the Constitution with a cautious
eye (Morrison V. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 1988). A much more in-depth and exhaustive
discussion of the constitutional debate on the unitary executive is found in the Harvard
Law Review in an article by Calabresi and Rhodes. The authors conclude that their
application of a holistic as opposed to alternate methodologies, i.e., the textural approach,
for analyzing the Constitution facilitates “the recapture of the Framers’ vision of three
competing, co-equal, and coordinate departments-no single one of which was given the
exclusive role of maintaining the constitutional plan.”9
The position of the Supreme Court concerning unitary executive was no obstacle
for John C. Yoo, who argued on behalf of the Bush administration that the powers of the
President extended beyond those stated in the Constitution. John Yoo’s justifications for
the extension of presidential power were extensively circulated in the articles of law
journals, books, and official White House Counsel memorandums. Yoo’s thinking has
already been incorporated and cited in this study in the examination of the historical and
9. Erwin Chernerinsky, Constutional Law, 2” ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, May 2005),
3 18-3 19.
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constitutional context of presidential war powers, but needs a few words more of
explanation.
Indeed, Yoo’s more comprehensive argument for the extension ofpresidential
power focuses not only on the power to make war without congressional consent, but the
power to infringe on the privacy of Americans in the fight against terror and the power to
ignore international agreements approved by Congress, i.e., agreements to protect
prisoners of war.10 In his own words, Yoo poses a philosophical argument for his
position on extending the power of the executive. Contrary to his critics, Yoo posits that
terror is an act of war and not a criminal act. He disagrees with the notion that only a
nation state can commit and act of war. Therefore, he concludes that the terrorists
committed an act of war and were not entitled to the civil protections to which the Bush
administrations critics claimed the terrorists were entitled. In turn, President Bush had
the war authority to treat the terrorists as he did because he reasoned that they were non-
uniformed combatants fighting for no country and, as such, were not entitled to the rights
granted prisoners under the Geneva Convention, whether the authority was granted by the
Constitution or not.
Staying with his philosophical position, Yoo continued to advise the Bush
administration to address terror as war and to move to change the communications laws
that would allow the government to collect domestic intelligence to more effectively
wage the war on terror, even if it meant infringing on the privacy of American citizens.
10. John Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against
Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Washington DC: Office of Legal Counsel, 2001), 23.
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In addition to the memorandum cited in the previous chapter, other memorandums were
issued by Mr. Yoo for the Department of Justice:
• Constitutionality of Amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to
Change the “Purpose” Standard for Searches, September 25, 2001
• Authority for use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the
United States, Oct. 23, 2001
• Memorandum on U.S. Citizens Detention by the Armed Forces, June 27,
2002
• Memo Regarding the Torture and Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful
Combatants Held Outside the United States, Released by the A.C.L.U.,
April 1, 2008.
Yoo was providing interpretations of the Constitution and the use of executive power at
the behest of Vice President Cheney who had long believed that the time had come to
reverse the flow ofpower away from the President in all matters pertaining to the
executive branch.
In a recent PBS documentary entitled “Cheney’s Law” on the TV show Frontline,
the intricacies regarding Cheney’s efforts to expand presidential power were publicly
unveiled. It is important to note that much of Cheney’s effort is based on his denial of
the role of Congress in checking the authority of the President regarding executive
matters, including declarations of war.
• The vice president believes that Congress has very few powers to actually
constrain the president and the executive branch, former Justice Department
attorney Marty Lederman tells FRONTLINE. “He believes the president
should have the final word indeed the only word on all matters within the
executive branch.”
After September Il, Cheney and Addington were determined to implement
their vision in secret. The vice president and his counsel found an ally in
John Yoo, a lawyer at the Justice Department’s extraordinarily powerful
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Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). In concert with Addington, Yoo wrote
memoranda authorizing the president to act with unparalleled authority.
In the documentary, when asked about his review of signing documents used by the Bush
administration to further assert the President’s authority, Charlie Savage, one of the
authors cited in this study in the previous chapter, noted the following:
It was none of Congress’ business what the government did, how it went about
it, what the limits of its conduct were. All these matters were solely for the
president to decide. So Congress could make laws for the rest of us, but not
for the government. The government existed to do what the president wanted
it to do at any given moment.”
Only six weeks after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, the administration of U.S. President Bush succeeded in pushing Congress to
pass the USA Patriot Act. Critics feared that the passage of the legislation signified a
major aggrandizement of executive power at the expense of both Congress and the courts.
Congressional Response
The Bush administration’s attempts to expand its powers through its War on
Terror established the framework for the congressional response. Congress’ response to
Bush’s conceptualization of the unitary executive within the context of the War on Terror
required a response on two fronts. First, Congress responded to President Bush’s effort
to expand his power to fight terror both on the domestic and international fronts. The
clearest manifestation of President Bush’s effort to fight on dual fronts was the passage of
the USA Patriot Act. Second, and more specifically, on the international front, President
Bush presented his arguments before Congress on the necessity to invade Iraq. On
October 11, 2002 the bill entitled, A Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United
11. Savage, Takeover: The Return of the hnperial Presidency, 50-269.
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States Armed Forces Against Iraq, passed the Senate with 77 votes for and 23 votes
against the resolution. It passed the House on Oct. 10, 2002: 296 for and 133 against.
Congressional Reaction to the USA Patriot Act
The Patriot Act, H.R. 3162, passed the House of Representatives on Oct. 24,
2001; the Senate passed the resolution on Oct.25, 2001. Some members of the Senate
expressed uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of the USA Patriot Act. For
example, Senators Daschle and Lehay both expressed reservations about the move to
revise FISA to more effectively fight the War on Terror. However, on Oct. 12, 2001,
Sen. Russell Feingold was the only Senator who opposed the USA Patriot Act. In a
situation reminiscent of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 7, 1964, the Senate
accepted the views of the Bush administration regarding the necessity and urgency to
strengthen the administration’s hand in fighting terrorism by using federal
communications laws to ferret out terrorists at home and abroad.
The proposed bill establishing the Patriot Act contained vast new powers for law
enforcement, some seemingly drafted in haste and others that came from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wish list that Congress had rejected in the past. Senator
Russell Feingold, Democrat from Wisconsin, in opposition to the proposed legislation
said, “You may remember that the Attorney General announced his intention to introduce
a bill shortly after the September 11 attacks. He provided the text of the bill the
following Wednesday, and urged Congress to enact it by the end of the week. That was
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plainly impossible, but the pressure to move on this bill quickly, without deliberation and
debate, has been relentless ever since.”2
Feingold cited several areas that he was in agreement with the administration and
the bill it proposed. However, he remained adamant in his opposition to those provisions
that threatened constitutionally guaranteed liberties:
my focus on the bill, as Chair of the Constitution Subcommittee of the
Judiciary Committee in the Senate, was on those provisions that implicate our
constitutional freedoms. And it was in reviewing those provisions that I came
to feel that the Administration’s demand for haste was inappropriate; indeed,
it was dangerous.’3
He ended by emphasizing that some of the more constitutionally offensive provisions of
the bill had been changed. Again, Feingold was the only Senator to vote against the
original USA Patriot Act in 2001.
Any student of the Constitution and the legislative process must ask, where did
the senatorial sage of the Constitution and the longest serving U.S. Senator, Robert Byrd
of West Virginia, stand on the USA Patriot Act in 2001? Senator Byrd voted for the Act.
It was only in 2006 that Senator Byrd, during the renewal of the USA Patriot Act, said
no. According to Byrd in 2006, “The Congress was stampeded, and the values of
freedom, justice and equality received a trampling in the headlong rush.” He added, “in
essence, this legislation has given the government too much power to pry.” Now with a
long list of complaints against what he says are the Bush administration’s overreaching
12. Russell Feingold, “Voting Against the United States Patriot Act,” An International Journal of




on the war on terror including a controversial eavesdropping program by the National
Security Agency Byrd is siding with Feingold against the Patriot Act. Byrd says he
regrets Voting for the Patriot Act. Table 1 includes the Congressional action or inaction
on the USA Patriot act.
Table 1. Congressional Action on the USA Patriot Act by Date
Source: The Center for Grassroots Oversight (http://www.historycommons.org/
timeline.jsp? civillibertiespatriot act civilliberties_patriot)
The attempt by the Bush administration to monopolize war prerogatives under the
guise of unitary executive rights is further documented by the fact that by June 12, 2003,
twenty-two cities had passed resolutions criticizing the Patriot and Homeland Securities
Act. Another seventy cities had similar resolutions in the works. Further exacerbating
the situation was the fact that by February 7, 2003, still another bill, this one entitled the
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (DSEA), was designed to complement the










First Draft of Patriot Act Introduced
Patriot Act is Introduced to Congress
Senators Daschle land Leahy raise concerns
Senator Feingold blocks vote on Patriot Act
House and Senate pass Act without reading it
Patriot Act becomes Law
Members of Congress ask Attorney General Aschcroft about
Patriot Act, are rebuffed
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knowledge of any members of Congress except House Speaker Dennis Hastert and
President of the Senate, Dick Cheney.15
Clearly, the Bush administration employed its concept of the unitary executive as
a tool to avoid Congress as it moved to fight the War on Terror. During the critical
period leading up to the invasion of Iraq, October 11, 2001 through March 21, 2003, and
despite the Bush administration’s attempts to thwart the will of Congress, the Congress
mounted little opposition to legislation that circumvented the intent of FISA through the
USA Patriot Act. Unfortunately, Congress’ opposition to legislation initiating the Iraq
War to destroy weapons of mass destruction and terrorist access to them was even more
tepid.
Congressional Response to the Initiation ofthe Iraq War
In the months leading up to the actual start of the Iraq War, the Bush
administration laid a strong ideological foundation, as evidenced in the National Security
Statement for 2002 and the writings of John Woo, to substantiate its claim that war
against Iraq was a necessity in order to fight the terror that had been unleashed on the
United States on 9/11. However, the weakest link in the administration’s argument was
the claim that Iraq possessed WMDs and was consorting with terrorists. On October 11,
2002, the US Congress authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq. In the
Senate, the vote was 77 for and 23 against; in the House the vote was 296 for and 133
against.
15. Feingold, Voting Against the United States PatriotAct, 1-85.
90
There were some members of Congress who questioned the presence of WMDs in
Iraq as evidenced by the number in each chamber who voted against the resolution to
commit US armed forces to Iraq. In spite of a great deal of confusion at the United
Nations and in the US over the existence of WMDs in Iraq, President Bush made the
removal of WMDs the cornerstone of his terrorist policy in 2002-03, even though it was
evident that terrorist affiliated with 9/11 had been trained in Afghanistan. Aside from the
rumors that the younger Bush wanted to avenge the attempt on his father’s life by
Saddam and that the US coveted Iraqi oil, what actually accounted for the Bush
administration’s assumption that it could build a war policy around the presence of
WMDs in Iraq? In a situation also reminiscent of the Tonkin Gulf incident, the answer
in large part lies with the quality of intelligence.
Uncertainty ofIntelligence
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Bush administration’s focus on W~vIDs
in Iraq is the path that led the Administration to believe that the WMDs actually existed.
The Bush administration’s insistence that WMDs existed is especially interesting
considering the fact that the UN inspection teams never found WMDs. It is important to
remember that it was the uncertainty of intelligence and President Johnson’s control over
information gathering and dissemination that led many in Congress to overwhelmingly
support the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. How then did the Bush administration eventually
provide the UN with a convincing argument about the existence of WMDs in Iraq
audaciously presented in a speech by Secretary of State Cohn Powell On February 5,
2003?
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The path that led to Powell’s speech at the UN, though ultimately delivered to and
accepted because of Powell’s much vaunted credibility, would be ironic if it were not for
the terrible consequences. It all begins with an intelligence asset who was code named
Curveball by German intelligence officers. Curveball’s story and his role in facilitating
the Bush administrations claim that Iraq possessed WMDs is told in a book by the same
name written by journalist Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles Times. Drogin’s interviews
with the German intelligence officers first generated interest in Curveball’s story.
The process by which the Bush administration became convinced that Iraq
possessed WMDs is divided into two parts. The first part traces the way the intelligence
regarding the WMDs was assembled and the second part outlines the way uncertain
intelligence, in large part from George Tenet, former CIA Director became an important
element in the Bush administration’s Iraq policy. In a scenario reminiscent of the Gulf
of Tonkin incident, Congress, in the months before the Iraq War, had little access to
independent sources of information that would have allowed it to verify the veracity of
the WMD claims made by President Bush.
The Con Man Who Caused a War
The full title ofDrogin’s book, Curvebali: Spies and Lies and the Con Man Who
Caused a War, speaks directly to the problem that intelligence officers had with
Curveball’s description of events and conditions with respect to the existence of WMDs
in Iraq. Curveball left Iraq and made his way to Germany where he told the German
intelligence agency (BND) that he was an Iraqi engineer who had worked in a facility in
Iraq that manufactured chemical and biological weapons. He further claimed that the
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facility in which he worked was headed by the individual appointed by Saddam to
manage the production of biological weapons. Lastly, he provided specific information
regarding mobile labs that were used to move the chemicals to different locations. The
latter information convinced some receiving the intelligence that the mobile labs
accounted for the UN inspector’s failure to locate WiviDs. Drogin provides a chronology
of events related to Curveball.’6
The information provided to German intelligence officials over the course of
several months led them to the conclusion that they could not verify Curveball’s
information principally because they believed the information had been altered to make
themselves seem more credible.17 The Germans also allowed an American doctor to test
Curveball’s blood to try to determine if he had been vaccinated to prevent illness from
Anthrax exposure or other germs used to make weapons. The medical tests were
inconclusive. 18
American intelligence officers, who were not permitted by the Germans to
interview Curveball, accepted the information without any great suspicion. According to
Drogin, the German’s doubts would not have mattered.
By mid-2000, the weapon’s analyst back at the CIA and DIA were enamored
with curveball’s gripping account, his direct access to the biological weapons
manager, his detailed designs, and his meticulous memory. No one
{Americans} doubted that Saddam was building germ weapons. Curveball
was only giving them the proof they needed.’9





Uncertain Intelligence and Policy Formulation
Assembling Faulty Intelligence
Although the German’s had closed their file on Curveball by 200 land tried to
push him out of Germany, once his story entered the intelligence apparatus of the US, it
became an important element in the justification for the US decision to invade Iraq. On
August 26, 2002, Vice President Cheney put the nation on alert, “Simply stated, there is
no doubt that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction,” Cheney announced. Without
naming Curveball, Cheney praised Iraqi defectors as a more accurate source of
information than UN inspectors.20 Drogin writes that Bush, Cheney, and Condolezza
Rice, at that time, the Secretary of State, continued to exaggerate what intelligence
agencies believed or confirmed far overshadowed Curveballs claims at that time.21
In contrast to Cheney, the top intelligence officer in the US government has stated
that he never confirmed that Curveball had provided the government with accurate
information about biological weapons in Iraq. According to George Tenet, Director of
the CIA in 2002, he never verified that the US had accurate intelligence on WMDs in
Iraq or about Saddam’s link to 9/11. In his memoir, At the Center of the Storm, My Years
at the CIA, Tenet gives his version of how the faulty intelligence provided by Curveball
found its way into US foreign policy toward Iraq and the War on Terror.
Tenet explains that the use of faulty intelligence resulted from the failure of
intelligence officer(s) at the European Desk to indicate to him and his deputy John




the Germans, regarding the manufacture ofbiological weapons of mass destruction was
questionable.
The mistakes in faulty intelligence culminated in the speech that Secretary of
State Cohn Powell made to the UN requesting that they support the United States
decision to invade Iraq. According to Tenet, the steps leading to the inclusion of faulty
intelligence in the Powell speech are as follows:
It was a great presentation, but unfortunately the substance didn’t hold up.
One by one, the various pillars of the speech, particularly on Iraq’s biological
and chemical weapons programs, began to buckle. The Secretary of state was
subsequently hung out to dry in front of the world, and our nation’s credibility
plummeted.
• The German Federal Intelligence Service, or BND, had an Iraqi source named
Curveball. Curveball alleged that Iraqi scientist had a biological weapons
program located in mobile laboratories that could be moved to evade UN
weapons inspectors.
• The BND pointed out to Drumheller that it was not certain the Curveball was
telling them the truth. Drumheller said that he was informed about the doubts
at a lunch with a BND officer. Drumheller said that he passed the information
on to Langley where it was widely known.
• Tenet said that “the information never reached him or Mclaughlin and Tenet
explains the steps that should have been followed to process the information
once Drumheller became aware of it.”
• What the German had to say at that lunch in late September or early October
2002 should have been immediately and formally disseminated as a matter of
record in a report that would have alerted intelligence and policy official to
the potential problems with Curvebahl.
• A second, corresponding formal report also should have been instantly sent
across the intelligence and policy communities to analysts and policy makers
who had received previous Curvebahl reporting. The transmittal of these two
reports would have immediately alerted experts doing the work on Iraq WMD
issues across the intelligence community to a problem requiring resolution.
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No such report was disseminated, nor was the issue ever brought to my
attention.22
In April 26, 2005, an L.A. Times story admitted not telling me personally
about the doubts. However, he said, “Everyone in the chain of command
knew exactly what was happening. . . Literally inches and inches of
documentation,” including “dozens and dozens of emails and memos,” show
that warnings had been sent to John Mclaughlin’s office and to WINPAC, and
that Curveball’s credibility had been seriously questioned in numerous
meetings.
• Our senior officer in Germany at the time says Drumheller never apprised him
of the luncheon conversation, nor did the Silberman-Rob Commission ever
interview him.
• The German BND representative denied calling Curveball a fabricator. He
only warned that he was a “single source” whose information the Germans
could not verify. 23
• A search of CIA records in 2005 revealed that a cable did come in to our
headquarters from our representative in Germany on December 20, 2002. The
cable went to Drumheller’s office for action.
• As far as I can tell, that cable never left Drumheller’s desk in the European
Division at Langley. Our senior officer in Berlin was expecting to get a
response from me to my German counterpart, because he cabled and e-mailed
our headquarters numerous times seeking one. That, too, would be standard
protocol. But none was forthcoming. I had never seen the German letter but
had simply been told that the German BND had cleared our use of the
Curveball material.
• On January 27, 2003, right before the Powell UN speech, our man in Germany
sent another cable, this one expressing his own reservations about the source.
He did so because he had received no response to his December 20 cable.
Curveball’s reporting was problematic and should be relied on only after most
serious consideration. 24 That cable was not properly logged into the European






• I did not believe that there could be any doubt among senior CIA officials at
the time that the Agency was depending heavily on Curveball’s information.
Why so many opportunities to sound the alarm were missed is a mystery to
me. Powell’s speech was one such moment, but there were many others:
preparation of the NIE and preparing Tenet’s testimony before Senate
Intelligence, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services Committees. But it was
not. 25
• When Drumheller and Tenet did speak directly, both stated that they did not
talk clearly and specifically about Curveball.26
Tenet clearly denied responsibility for the Bush administration’s presumption that there
was sufficient and unambiguous intelligence for claiming that there were WMDs in Iraq.
Unlike the Tonkin Gulf incident, Congress had an alternative source of information, other
than that provided by the administration. That alternate source was the UN. However,
the Bush administration continued to push its scenario for the existence of WMDs in Iraq.
It appears that the majority of the members of Congress were more convinced by how the
Bush administration presented its arguments than by the proof available to substantiate
the argument.
Intelligence and the Policy Apparatus
The faulty intelligence on which the Bush administration relied became the basis
for three critical and authoritative documents that many members of Congress apparently
found convincing. The first was the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for 2002. The
second was President Bush’s state of the union address and the third was Secretary of




National Intelligence Estimate 2002
It was clear from the NIE of 2002 that the US intelligence community was less
than certain about WMDs in Iraq, both nuclear and biological. Further, the NIE makes
some claims that the Director of the CIA said were never substantiated. The NIE for 2002
concluded Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This Estimate:
High ConfIdence:
• Iraq is continuing, and in some areas, expanding its chemical, biological,
nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.
• We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.
• Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.
• Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires
sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.
Moderate Confidence:
• Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one but
is likely to have a weapon by 2007 to 2009. (See INR alternative view, page
84).
Low Confidence:
• When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.
• Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the US
Homeland.
• Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons
with Al-Queda.
The Axis ofEvil
In his 2002 State of the Union Speech, President Bush made his most compelling
and coherent argument for invading Iraq. Bush touched on all of the themes that had
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been presented authoritatively, although inaccurately in some instances, in a variety of
formats. He drew on the information from the NIE and the themes from the National
Security Strategy to provide a response to the gut-wrenching events of 9/11. In such an
emotional context, and at a time when the US had been one of the few nations victimized
by terrorism, most members of Congress shared the president’s compulsion to invade
Iraq.
The aspect of President Bush’s speech that generated the most buzz was his use of
the phrase the “axis of evil.” The “axis of evil” referred to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.
According to the President, these nations presented a threat to the US because they were
sponsors of terror. In fact, there was no intelligence that any of the three nations was a
sponsor of terrorist. Therefore, US policy had to be reconfigured to accommodate the
“axis of evil.”
For example, Secretary of State Cohn Powell instructed his senior officers that
they were to make no attempts to reinterpret what the president had said. According to
Powell, the President had said “axis of evil” and it was policy. 27 Similarly, National
Security Adviser Condolezza Rice had her speech writers move quickly to revise a
speech she was to present to the Conservative Political Action Committee in order to
match President Bush’s pronouncements. All three nations in the Axis ofEvil issued
strong rebuttals to the characterizations given them by the President. “This statement of
President Bush is stupid,” the Iraqi vice president said. 28 The denials of aggression and




made it even more difficult, especially in the context of 9/11, for some members of
Congress to question the President, in spite of the faulty and uncertain intelligence upon
which the claims were based.
Powell and the UN
The most perplexing step in the Bush administration’s march toward the Iraq War
was the performance of Secretary of State Cohn Powell. The Bush administration
thought that it was important that Secretary Powell, as one of the more respected
members of the administration, make the case before the UN for war against Iraq. Powell
was integral to the Bush strategy because of his high profile in diplomatic circles and his
experience as a senior military official. It seems that following 9 11, Powell was solidly
behind the Bush administration’s policy to stop terrorists. Apparently, it was only as
Powell reviewed the intelligence on Iraq that he questioned whether or not the
intelligence was as clear and compelling as some of his colleagues thought including
Condolezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld. As he prepared for his UN presentation, Powell
wanted to balance his doubts about the intelligence with his knowledge of what the
terrorists actually wanted to accomplish.
George Tenet told Powell that the CIA had vetted every sentence of his
presentation and that they had not taken the intelligence further than it should go.29
Powell insisted that Tenet accompany him to the UN, apparently to certify the legitimacy
of the information that Powell would present. At the UN, Powell proceeded to explain in
excruciating detail each of the major points that he made.
29. Ibid.
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In one of his strongest charges, Powell referred to witnesses who had seen
Saddam’s WMDs. Powell affirmed, “We know Saddam is determined to keep his
WMDs, and he is determined to make more.”30 According to Woodward, “The
important element is that it was Powell who made the case.”31 Of course, no WMDs had
been found.
Even though Tenet told Powell that the speech had been thoroughly vetted to
make statements that could only be substantiated by the intelligence, to the CIA’s credit,
the reference to the information provided by Curveball was spotted. After reading a draft
of the Powell’s UN speech, Margaret the supervisor to Drumheller, to whom Tenet
referred earlier, said to Drumheller, “This is Curveball’s shit.”32
Margaret’s anger had been rekindled. According to Drogin, she had had a heated
exchange with other CIA officials about the fact that Curveball’s accounts of biological
weapons and mobile labs had not been verified. At some point prior to the vetting of
Powell’s UN speech, Margaret asked a CIA analyst how she had verified Curveball’s
information and her response was “over the internet.” Margaret retorted: “That is also
where he got it.”33
Powell had made a convincing but flawed case for the presence ofWMDs in Iraq
and the argument had been based on uncertain intelligence. The majority of the members






Congress went on to pass the resolution to attack Iraq by overwhelming majorities, some
members did voice concerns.
Congress Reacts
Behind the scenes, members of Congress were presented with information and
given briefings that were designed to enhance their support for the Bush administration’s
decision to invade Iraq. Congress had no independent sources of information that would
have allowed members to more effectively assess the intelligence provided by the Bush
administration. The individuals who doubted President Bush’s claim that WMDs were
present in Iraq had to question and rely on the Bush official’s response to their questions.
A brief outline of congressional action by its leadership helps to characterize the
way the institution reacted in the days leading up to the passage of the resolution to
declare war on Iraq: Senator Graham of Florida had been briefed by Cheney, and the
briefing left him very troubled. ~ Senator Graham was told that a great deal of military
effort would be necessary to achieve the objective of changing the regime in Iraq because
diplomatic efforts had failed. u
• Graham’s reaction?
• “Well, I am unconvinced that going to Iraq is the appropriate thing to do in the
immediate future,” he said. “And I’ll define the immediate future as being the
next two or three years. I believe pursuing this war on terrorism is a very






• Graham said that, “He {Cheney} sort of glides over the issue of terrorism and
unites it with weapons of mass destruction.37
• Graham asserted that the Bush administration, or at least Cheney, had changed the
definition of the war on terrorism. “Now we are defining terrorist states as those
states that might have the ability to provide weapons of mass destruction, even if
they themselves are not engaged in terrorist activities or providing sanctuary.”38
• Graham and other Senate Democrats pressed the administration to provide a new
NIE to more clearly define the threat that Iraq posed.
• On October 2, some senators focused on the larger questions the CIA had not
addressed.
• No senator had enough of the picture--military planning details were not provided
to the Hill and the CIA plans were highly classified-to frame an effective
critique .~
• Also on October 2, some senators were floating alternative proposals for a
congressional resolution that would give bush less than a blank check.
• On October 8, at least 47 senators were briefed or shown the entire NIE with its
key judgment that Iraq “has chemical and biological weapons.”4°
Senator Collins ofMaine agreed with Cohn Powell that unless Congress passed the
authorization to use force, the Security Council would find a way to sidestep the issue.41
Senator Kennedy ofMassachusetts said he “. . . did not believe the administration had







unilateral preemptive strike and immediate war are necessary. Nor has the administration
laid out the cost in blood and treasure for this operation.”42
Senator Kerry, also of Massachusetts, gave President Bush rhetorical support by
stating that Saddam”. . . has a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his
hands; a grave threat to our security.”43
Senators Daschle and Feinstein, who had been vocal critics along the way, in the
end voted for the resolution, which stated that the president could use the military under
the “necessary and appropriate standard to defend against “the continuing threat posed by
Iraq.” Woodard concluded, “It was a blank check.”44
When the Congress approved the resolution to use military force against Iraq, it is
clear that none of the critical actors in the Bush administration or Congress had accurate
intelligence upon which to base a sound decision regarding Iraq. It is interesting to note
that the Viet Nam War was initiated because of poor intelligence based on technology,
and the Iraq War was initiated on the basis of faulty human intelligence. Apparently,
going to war in the absence of a direct threat to the homeland, which mitigates guessing
about intelligence, will always leave Congress at a disadvantage in exercising its control
over the executive war-making power. Since Congress was unable to constrain President
Bush’s war making power in Iraq, the media and public opinion should have served as a





The Media in the Initiation of the Iraq War
The media and public opinion, as in the case study of Viet Nam, are considered
interdependently because of the public’s reliance on the media for information about the
US government’s decisions to initiate war. Additionally, the media’s reaction to the
government’s decision to initiate war often reflects the public’s attitude toward these
decisions. There was no literature that suggested either theoretically or empirically that
public opinion serves as a constraint on presidential decisions to initiate war. However,
as with Vietnam, once wars are initiated and the costs become evident, public opinion
then becomes a factor in how the president tends to manage the war.
Veteran journalist Bill Moyers, who worked in the Johnson White House during
the Vietnam War, also reported on the Iraq War. Moyers, in an article entitled, Buying
the Iraq War, has offered his picture of the media’s role in reporting or not reporting the
events leading up to the Iraq War.45 Taken as a whole, the articles assembled by Moyers
clearly indicate that while there were journalists, as there were members of Congress,
who seriously questioned the Bush administration’s claims about WMDs in Iraq, the
majority of the media gave the administration the benefit of the doubt. Further, there is
no evidence that public opinion in any way made the media more vocal in its opposition
to the president, or served as a direct constraint on President Bush’s decision to use force
in Iraq. The available polling data shows that the public supported President Bush’s
decisions and his actions relative to Iraq.
45. Bill Moyers, Buying the Iraq War, http: www.pbs.org moyers journal btw watch.htrnl
[accessed June 12, 2009].
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In the Vietnam case study, several contexts for understanding the role of the
media were outlined: the media as the Fourth Estate, the media in democratic theory
versus practice, the media as an objective, yet dependent institution, and media responses
in an era of expanded presidential power. With respect to the media performing any
potential role as a constraining force on presidential war power, only two of the foregoing
seems to have had any bearing on the initiation of the Iraq War. Furthermore, perusal of
media coverage and reporting of the Iraq War during that period indicate that the media
did not function as the Fourth Estate, and neither did it serve the role attributed to it by
democratic theory. In a slightly more positive sense, some members of the media tried to
encourage fellow reporters to function as objective observers. In the final analysis,
however, the media functioned only as it could in an era of expanded presidential power.
Objectivity and Dependence
The media is best characterized as slightly objective and very dependent, during
the lead-up to the Iraq War. Some members of the media did their best to provide
objective reporting regarding the Bush administration’s claims about WMDs in Iraq.
However, with the exception of the UN report issued December 19, after the passage of
the war resolution, journalists did not have access to independent information upon which
to base their reporting. 46 Consequently, most of the editors at newspapers throughout the
country refused to challenge the Bush administration and chose not to place anti-
administration news reports on Iraq where they could easily be noticed. According to
Howard Kurtz, the media critic for the Washington Post and the host of CNN’s Reliable
46. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The National Security Strategy Briefing.
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Sources, “From August 2002 until the war was launched in March of 2003, there were
about 140 front page pieces in the Washington Post making the administration’s case for
war. But there were only a handful of stories that ran on the front page that made the
opposite case, or, if not making the opposite case, raising questions.”47
Media Objectivity
From the inquiry about the media and its role or non-role in the Viet Nam War, an
informal model about how to assess the role of the media as a constraint on presidential
war power was suggested. Hallin in his work, The Uncensored War: The Media and Viet
Nam, suggested that the issue of objectivity and dependence is the most critical issue in
the media’s effort to evaluate and report on the President’s claims regarding the need to
go to war.48 Hallin pointed out several factors to consider in analyzing the role of media
as a constraint: the use of official sources, the focus on the president (substitute executive
branch), and the role of interpretation or analysis compared to factual reporting.49
A look at the role of the media in the initiation of the Iraq War revealed that
objectivity and reliance on official sources greatly influenced the media’s capacity to
challenge what the Bush administration was saying about the presence of WMDs in Iraq,
the basis upon which the nation committed to war. Prior to the passage of the October 10
and 11 resolutions authorizing the use of force against Iraq, neither Congress nor the
media had any reliable alternative sources of information. Obviously, they realized that
47. Ibid..




the intelligence was muddled, but they could only question its veracity and were not
prepared to challenge it with independently verified information.
Not only was there a problem regarding the media’s capacity to obtain objective
information from the executive branch, there was also a problem with the objectivity of
some leading journalists who entertained a slightly more ideological interpretation and
assessment of the presence of WMDs in Iraq. Hallin pointed out that in the lead-up to the
Vietnam War, many of the leading journalists were speaking on behalf of officials in
Washington, including the highly respected James Reston and the Alsop brothers.
Unfortunately, some of today’s most influential journalists are not as dispassionate as
their journalistic responsibilities require.5°
The journalist who has been singled out as the most offensive violator of the
boundary between commentary and the role of facts in that commentary is William
Safire. Safire is a retired journalist who writes a column for the New York Times along
with his Sunday articles on language. Many American journalists took Safire to task, for
example, over his claims that there was a link between Al Queda and Saddam Hussein.5’
Andrew Christie wrote a cogent article on Safire’s failure to present the facts in
his commentary. Safire and his editor responded that commentary did not require facts.
On September 24, 2001, Safire wrote, “The clear link between the terrorist in hiding
(Osama) and the terrorist in power (Saddam) can be found in Kurdistan, that northern




anyone else who will listen) that the Iraqi dictator has armed and financed a fifth column
ofAl Qaeda mullahs and terrorists)’52
As it became increasingly evident that Satire’s claim about the connection
between Al Queda and Saddam was false, the New York Times acknowledged that there
were errors in what Satire had written; however, the paper refused to issue a correction.
Satire himself went further claiming that what he had written was his opinion and thus
commentary that did not require fact.53 A debate ensued between Andrew Christie and
the editors of the Times over the difference between opinionated reporting versus factual
reporting,54 the same issue that Hallin raised about journalistic ethics during the Viet
Nam conflict. The outcomes of both wars were similar in that the media was virtually
silent at the start of each war, choosing to not to verify or investigate the alleged facts
presented by each president, and thus evaded its role as the watchdog for the people.
Subsequent to the start of the Iraq War, many media outlets looked back on their
reporting leading up to the war and admitted that they had made errors, but as Bill
Moyers said, what accounted for the mistakes in reporting and judgment by the media?
In addition to the absence of independent sources, much of the information that the media
had access to was the result of a propaganda war waged by individuals associated with
the Bush administration. The Rendon Group, for example, headed by it principal
consultant, John Rendon, was an independent contractor to the CIA and the Department
52. William Safire, Commentary, http: www.cornrnondrearns.org viewsO4 0625-14.htm




of Defense and was contracted to help the CIA and DOD to manage information on the
Iraq War in the US and internationally. According to James Bradford, author of the
article, “The Man Who Sold the War: Meet John Rendon, Bush’s General in the
Propaganda War,” this organization was responsible for much of the misinformation that
was planted both for domestic and international media consumption. ~ The fact that a
misinformation campaign existed substantiates the point that the media relied on access
to information that the government provided either directly from official sources or
indirectly from contracted sources. Regardless of its source, however, much of the
information upon which journalists based their reports and commentaries were
inaccurate. More disturbing, given the high costs of the Iraq War, is that influential
journalists, like William Safire prior to the initiation of the war, refused to acknowledge
that there were problems with the Bush administration’s claims. 56
Apart from the details that are provided by James Bradford, refuted by the
Rendon Group, then rebutted by Bradford,57 below is a summary of the critical facts
regarding the objectivity and independence of the media during the Iraq War: Three
weeks after the September 11 attacks, according to documents obtained from defense
sources, the Pentagon awarded a large contract to the Rendon Group. Around the same
time, Pentagon officials also set up a highly secret organization called the Office of
Strategic Influence. Part of the OSI’s mission was to conduct covert disinformation and
55. James Bradford, “The Man Who Sold the War: Meet John Rendon, Bush’s General in the
Propaganda War,” Rolling Stone, http: www.ro11ingstone.com/politics/story 879897 the man who




deception operations planting false news items in the media and hiding their origins.
“It’s sometimes valuable from a military standpoint to be able to engage in deception with
respect to future anticipated plans,” Vice President Dick Cheney said in explaining the
operation. Even the military’s top brass found the clandestine unit unnerving. “When I
get their briefings, it’s scary,” a senior official said at the time.
• Still another newly formed propaganda operation in which Rendon played a
major part was the Office of Global Communications, which operated out of
the White House and was charged with spreading the administration’s
message on the War in Iraq. Every morning at 9:30, Rendon took part in the
White House OGC conference call, where officials would discuss the theme
of the day and who would deliver it. The office also worked closely with the
White House Iraq Group, whose high-level members, including recently
indicted Cheney chief of staff Lewis Libby, were responsible for selling the
war to the American public.
• Never before in history had such an extensive secret network been established
to shape the entire world’s perception of a war. “It was not just bad
intelligence it was an orchestrated effort,” says Sam Gardner, a retired Air
Force colonel who has taught strategy and military operations at the National
War College. “It began before the war, was a major effort during the war and
continues as post-conflict distortions.”
• The Bush administration took everything Rendon had to offer. Between 2000
and 2004, Pentagon documents show, the Rendon Group received at least
thirty-five contracts with the Defense Department, worth a total of $50 million
to $100 million.
• As the acknowledged general of such propaganda warfare, Rendon insists that
the work he does is for the good of all Americans. Rendon states, “For us, it’s
a question of patriotism,” he says. “It’s not a question of politics, and that’s an
important distinction. I feel very strongly about that personally. If brave men
and women are going to be put in harm’s way, they deserve support.”
• Bradford responds, “But in Iraq, American troops and Iraqi civilians were put
in harm’s way, in large part, by the false information spread by Rendon and
the men he trained in information warfare. And given the rapid growth of
what is known as the “security-intelligence complex” in Washington, covert
perception managers are likely to play an increasingly influential role in the
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wars of the future. The Rendon Group’s response link is at the end of the
Bradford article and so is Bradford’s response to the Rendon Group.58
Clearly, misinformation and propaganda are tools that are always evident in war
time situations; however, what appears to be somewhat unique about the use of
propaganda in this instance is the deliberate employment of an organization with the goal
of distorting information to fit presidential goals, in this case, the invasion of a sovereign
nation. In addition, neither Congress nor the media were strategically situated to access
alternative official information sources, and as we now know from the example of the
Rendon Group, any information sources to which Congress, and especially the media had
access, were likely tainted by the Bush propaganda machine.
Again, we learn from the lead-up to the Iraq War that in an era of expanded
presidential power, it is almost impossible for the media and Congress to act as
constraints on presidential war power. George Bush and Dick Cheney set out to expand
and strengthen presidential power relative to the other branches of government. Their
notions of the unitary executive coupled with the Bush Doctrine provided the Bush
administration with the tools it needed to make the case for waging war against Iraq and
to offset the influence of both Congress and the media as constraints on presidential war
power.
Along with the Congress and the media, democratic theory suggests that public
opinion should exercise some influence over critical presidential decisions, especially one
as important as going to war. However, our understanding of constraints on presidential
58. Bradford, “The Man Who Sold the War:,” http://www.rollingstone.com/politics story
879897 the man who sold the war 2 [accessed June 12, 2009].
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war power during the Viet Nam War indicates that public opinion played no role during
the initiation of the War. In fact, the public was dependent on the information that the
Johnson administration provided about the Tonkin Gulf incident, which formally initiated
the war against North Viet Nam. Even though the Iraq War began during what has been
designated the Information Age, the constraining influence of democratic forces has been
severely mitigated by the absence of accurate information from non-governmental
sources. ~ Was the public’s influence also diminished during the initiation of the Iraq
War?
Public Opinion and the Initiation ofthe Iraq War
In the lead-up to the Iraq War, there is little empirical data that suggests a positive
answer to the foregoing question. The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)
at the University of Maryland and Knowledge Networks published a study of seven polls
which relate directly to the issue regarding public opinion raised in this study. The polls
were conducted January through September, 2003.60 The thesis presented here draws on
the polls conducted January through March, prior to the invasion of Iraq on March 21,
2003. The size of the sample for the period under consideration, January through March,
was 4,044. The margin of error for the sample was +1-2-3 .5°o (The PIPA!Knowledge
Networks Poll).61 Table 2 includes the PIPA poil findings.
59. Ibid.
60. The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), http: www.worldpublicopinion.org
pipa/articles international security bt/102.php?nid [accessed June 25, 2009].
61. Ibid.
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Table 2. Public Support for Going to War with Iraq
Topic Date Response
Believed there was a connection 2 3 03 85° o believed the connection
between Sadaam and 9/11 terrorist
Favored going to war with Iraq 3/3 03 66% favored going to war
Favored invading Iraq and 2/3/03 84% favored invading Iraq and
overthrowing Hussein overthrowing Hussein
Believed there was evidence Iraq 1/3/03 55% said no evidence but believe it’s
played a role in 9/11 true;
13° o said there was conclusive
evidence
Source: The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), http://www.worldpublic
opinion.org/pipaJarticles/international securitybt/ 1 02.php?nid.
The polling data show that the majority of the American public never really
wavered in either its belief that Saddam was connected with 9/11 or in its desire to
overthrow him. In light of the success of the initial invasion and the propaganda effort to
mislead the Congress and the media, there is little surprise that Americans were heavily
influenced by President George W. Bush to accept his explanations regarding the need to
invade Iraq. Furthermore, the public, like the Congress and the media, had no alternate
domestic sources of information to challenge President Bush’s position on the need for
war with Iraq. Finally, the alternate source of information on WMDs was overshadowed
by Secretary of State Cohn Powell’s convincing but faulty arguments before the UN
about the presence of WMDs in Iraq. It is clear that Congress, the media, and the public,
according to democratic theory, should have served as constraints on presidential war
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authority to initiate the war with Iraq. These three checks and balances instead seemed at
the mercy of the Bush administration in its march toward war, and in Barbara Tuchman’s
words, march toward folly.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
A prima facie understanding of the initiation of the Viet Nam and Iraq Wars has
been suggested using an approach that examines the provocation, perception, reaction,
and motivations associated with each war. Table 3 summarizes the foregoing factors
relative to both the Johnson and Bush administrations and the war that each executed.
Both wars were precipitated by perceived threats that had little basis in fact communism
did not threaten the United States in 1963, and there were no weapons of mass
destruction in 2003. The attacks that led to each war also served as pretexts for
retaliation. In both wars, an existing or emerging world view was the most salient factor
that contributed to war.
Table 3. Factors Relative to the Johnson and Bush Administrations
Administration’s
Action Viet Nam War Iraq War Source
Provocation The failure of the September 11th attacks on Bornet, Vaughn. The
Vietnamese Nationalist, the World Trade Center Presidency of Lyndon
known as the Viet Minh, to and the Pentagon in New B. Johnson. Lawrence
gain control of southern York City and Kansas. University of
Vietnam both during and Washington D.C. in the Kansas Press(1983)
after their struggle for United States
independence from France Woodward, Bob. Bush
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at War. New York, NY.
Simon & Schuster.
(2002)
Source: Information assembled from the sources in this thesis
However, in the more critical analysis presented here, the historical background
behind the specific political decisions that initiated each war were examined. In so doing,
the wars were analyzed within the context of the major research question posed:
Presidential Power and the Law: What were the factors that led Presidents to exceed
Administration’s




constitutional limitations of their authority?
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Findings and Conclusions
In terms of their most immediate causes, the factors precipitating the Viet Nam
and Iraq Wars, within the context of the analysis presented here, was unrestrained
presidential power. The major constraints on American presidential power, the congress,
the media, and public opinion, all failed during the period in which the wars were
initiated. A comparative analysis of the Johnson Administration during the Viet Nam
War and the Bush Administration during the Iraq War indicates that in neither conflict
did Congress exercise its own constitutional authority. In spite of the media clamor after
the two wars were started, the initiation of both wars did not engender sharp scrutiny or
criticism from the media. Similarly, public opinion in America was not adverse to
American involvement in Viet Nam or Iraq when the wars started.
Conducive Factors Promoting the Vietnam and Iraq Wars
• Ideology played a major role in initiating both the Viet Nam and Iraq Wars.
After WW II and the emergence of the Soviet Union and Communist China,
the erection of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban Missile crisis, U.S. foreign
policy was directed at containing communism no matter what the cost. As a
result, any dispute with other countries was influenced by the presumed threat
of the spread of Godless communism; such was the case with events in Viet
Nam. The foreign policy apparatus of the United States, including the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and later the entire Senate viewed U.S.
response to events in Viet Nam through the lens of anti communism.
The Johnson administration ignored decades of history which indicated that
the conflict between North and South Viet Nam was part of the broader
struggle for self-determination of Viet Nam from France, with the assistance
rather than the control of Communist China. The incidents in the Gulf of
Tonkin were considered by many U.S. decision makers as evidence that North
Viet Nam was a communist aggressor that had to be repelled and crushed.
Therefore, formally introducing U.S. troops into Viet Nam through the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution was deemed the appropriate response to communist
aggression.
118
In similar fashion, by 2003, after several terrorist attacks against the United
States, including 9/11, the Bush Doctrine had become the cornerstone of U.S.
foreign policy. The Bush Doctrine enunciated the view that the United States
would seek out and attack terrorists in any part of the world, including any
country that allowed terrorists a safe harbor. In effect, the United States
would attack terrorist, destroy weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that
terrorist might use, and attack countries from which terrorists both operated
and hid. Within the context of the Bush Doctrine, Sadaam Hussein’s
anticipated possession of WMDs made Iraq a logical target for attack.
Additionally, the notion that Sadaam Hussein was associated with terrorist
further supported the Bush administration’s desire to attack Iraq.
• Uncertain Intelligence, unfortunately, served as the basis for the decisions
made both by the Johnson and Bush administrations to initiate war. For
example, President Johnson himself was uncertain whether or not the USS
Maddox had actually been attacked by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of
Tonkin. With respect to Sadaam and WMDs, it is clear that the Bush
administration had credible evidence, based on refutation of its major
intelligence source, Curveball, that it was highly questionable that there were
WMDs in Iraq. Yet, in spite of doubtful evidence in the Gulf of Tonkin
incident and regarding Iraq and WMDs, decisions were made to initiate war.
• Precedence and constitutional interpretation as factors contributing to the Viet
Nam and Iraq Wars have deep roots in American history. It has been widely
accepted that the Constitution places the power to declare war in the hands of
the Congress. However, by the time of the Civil War, President Lincoln had
begun to assume powers that were based on interpretations of authority vested
in the Executive branch. By the twentieth century, the further deterioration of
congressional authority to declare war occurred as greater reliance was placed
on the role of the president as commander-in-chief.
To avoid political conflict with Congress, President Johnson sought its
authorization through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, although he postulated
that he need not actually need it. Similarly, the Bush administration, through
its interpretation of the Unitary Executive, argued that it did not need to secure
congressional authorization to take extra-constitutional steps to fight the war
on terror. In part, because of the turmoil swirling around the need to combat
terror, uncertainty about WMDs in Iraq, and the use of the Patriots Act,
President Bush wanted congress to approve the invasion of Iraq. To some
extent, the major issue that emerges is why didn’t Congress exert its authority
to halt both Presidents Johnson and Bush, since they went to congress for
approval even though neither thought the approval necessary?
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Congress
The comparative analysis presented here revealed that congress supported
America’s entrance into both the Viet Nam and Iraq Wars. In the case of Viet Nam, the
United States House of Representatives unanimously supported the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and only two Senators voted against the resolution. In the absence of an
independent source of intelligence, the Congress was not endowed with the capacity to
more accurately determine whether the reported attacks warranted retaliation. A detailed
analysis of the debate on Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in the Senate reveals that most
senators trusted what the President conveyed to them about the incident and their world
view regarding the dangers of communism proved sufficient to overcome any doubts that
the majority may have had regarding the accuracy of the information about the attacks by
the North Vietnamese.
Thirty-seven years after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed initiating the
Viet Nam War, the United States Congress remained solely dependent on the executive
branch for intelligence on making decisions to go to war. The Bush administration told
both congress and the secretary of state what it wanted them to know about WMDs in
Iraq, the most direct and immediate reason provided to invade Iraq. Although there were
more doubts in the Senate about WMDs in Iraq than there had been about attacks in the
Gulf of Tonkin, in the end, the Congress approved the resolution to attack Iraq. While
the United States Congress had information from the U.N. that cast doubt on WMDs in
Iraq, the Bush’s effort to link Iraq to terrorism was successful and most in congress felt
compelled to launch war against Iraq.
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Media and Public Opinion
In theory and in view of the twenty-four news cycle, it would be easy to conclude
that the media serves as an effective watch dog over the affairs of government. However,
in 1963 and 2003 regarding the Vietnam and Iraq Wars respectively, the media did not
serve as a constraint on the use of presidential power that led the nation to war. During
the initiation of the Vietnam War, the President controlled information on U.S. foreign
policy and the way it was given to the media through press releases, propaganda ridden
misinformation and other strictly controlled means of enlightening the public. The media
and the public instead both depended upon the executive branch to provide insights
regarding the impact of American policy around the world, especially in areas of conflict.
The most influential journalists of the period often served as spokespersons for the
government in their commentaries on foreign policy. Only rarely did independent voices
challenge the government’s interpretation of events that were leading the United States to
war against North Viet Nam.
While there were no independent sources guiding public opinion during the
initiation of the Viet Nam War, scholars have concluded that on foreign policy, the
American public takes its lead from the President. Therefore, the public’s attitude toward
Viet Nam in the early stages was colored by the information provided by the President.
Considering that the President was in a position to shape the attitude of congress toward
the war, there is little reason to assume that prior to 1965, that the American public was
opposed in any significant way to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. With respect to
Iraq, the articles assembled by Moyers clearly indicate that while there were journalists,
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as there were members of Congress, who seriously questioned the Bush administration’s
claims about WMDs in Iraq, the majority of the members of the media gave the
administration the benefit of the doubt. Further, there is no evidence that when public
opinion contrary to administration policies was finally expressed in any way, that it made
the media more vocal in its opposition to the president, or served as a direct constraint on
President Bush’s decision to use force in Iraq. The available polling data does show that
the public supported President Bush’s decisions and his actions relative to Iraq, though
eventually, as with many members of Congress, positions regarding the war changed.’
Recommendations
Even though it is clear that the United States Constitution limits the power of the
President to initiate war without congressional consent, both President Johnson and Bush
were able to secure congressional consent, in part, because they influenced congress to
act within a context of uncertainty and often misinformation. Neither President Johnson
at the initiation of the Viet Nam War nor Bush at the start of the Iraq War was certain that
the enemy had taken actions that would threaten American interest or lives. However, in
an atmosphere of uncertainty, both presidents were able to convince congress that
American interests were in danger.
Given the President’s control of intelligence that is often uncertain, political
scientists need to research the practicality of providing Congress with an independent
entity to cross check the intelligence provided by the President. Constitutional scholars
should continue to explore presidential decisions to initiate war by authorizing law that
1. Elmer Cornwell. Presidential Leadership ofPublic Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1966), 4-5.
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force the executive branch to justify decisions to go to war. Further, the extreme
interpretations of the unitary executive, while serving political ends, should not remain
unchallenged, especially when used to justify the initiation of war. The stakes are too
high and the consequences often devastating.
The inadequate scrutiny of the media during the initiation of the Viet Nam War
and the Iraq War suggests that the media has not served the nation well as the Fourth
Estate and in that role, it has not done a sufficient job in informing public opinion, which
was all but absent during Vietnam and tepid during the Iraq War. With all executive
decisions to go to war, the media and the public that it informs should critically assess
those decisions. The media should devote as much scrutiny to executive decisions to
enter war as it does to the execution of war once initiated.
Finally, the focus of research regarding the extra-constitutional use of war
authority should shift to an analysis of what makes congress, the media, and the public so
complicit when war is initiated. The clamor and outcry against war tends to come after
the commitment to fight has been made. It appears that the media and the public, but
especially the Congress are reluctant to be perceived as unpatriotic during times of crisis.
However, it is during times of military crisis that patriotism needs to be demonstrated
through closer scrutiny to decisions which can plunge America into wars that can be too
costly and also too devastating in tenns of loss of human life.
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